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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the Natural Hazards Research 
Platform (NHRP) initiated a series of Short Term Recovery Projects (STRP) aimed at 
facilitating and supporting the recovery of Christchurch from the earthquake impacts. 
This report presents the outcomes of STRP 6: Impacts of Liquefaction on Pipe 
Networks, which focused on the impacts of liquefaction on the potable water and 
wastewater systems of Christchurch. The project was a collaborative effort of NHRP 
researchers with expertise in liquefaction, CCC personnel managing and designing the 
systems and a geotechnical practitioner with experience/expertise in Christchurch 
soils and seismic geotechnics. The project team members were: 
Misko Cubrinovski, Professor, University of Canterbury (Project Leader) 
Ian McCahon, Director, Geotech Consulting (Geotechnical Engineer) 
Matthew Hughes, Research Associate, University of Canterbury (GIS Specialist) 
Brendon Bradley, Lecturer, University of Canterbury 
Yvonne McDonald, Civil Engineering Consultant, Practical Consulting 
Howard Simpson, Team Leader, Capital Delivery, Christchurch City Council 
Rod Cameron, Infrastructure Rebuild Leader, Christchurch City Council 
Mark Christison, Unit Manager, City Water and Waste, Christchurch City Council 
Bruce Henderson, Team Leader Asset Management, Christchurch City Council 
John Walter, Senior Environmental Engineer 
Aylwin Sim, Asset Management Analyst, Christchurch City Council 
Gordon Taylor, Contracts Engineer, Christchurch City Council 
Rolando Orense, Senior Lecturer, University of Auckland 
 
The project was organized around three objectives: 
1) Providing immediate advice, solutions and recommendations to the CCC with 
regard to geotechnical, liquefaction and seismic issues relevant for the systems 
2) Documenting and evaluating the performance of the potable water and 
wastewater systems of Christchurch, and 
3) Developing concepts and implementing procedures towards improved seismic 
resilience of the systems  
Within this framework, a number of issues were addressed, as summarized in this 
report. Regular meetings of the project team were used for communication, exchange 
of ideas and progress reporting (minutes of 23 meetings available from Yvonne 
McDonald). The key findings are presented in eleven sections of this report including 
first a description of the intensity of seismic loads (Section 2) and liquefaction 
manifestation (Section 3) and their distribution through Christchurch. Sections 4 and 5 
summarize the performance of the potable water and wastewater systems of 
Christchurch, while Section 6 summarizes the specific design and operational issues 
addressed including modifications of standards and practices resulting from this 
project work and associated activities. The discussion initiated on the performance 
objectives for the systems is summarized in Section 7. A Liquefaction Zoning Map 
was developed for Christchurch that classifies areas of the city in five different zones 
with respect to their liquefaction resistance (Section 8). The strength of each zone is 
defined relative to the reference Zone 1. For example, the average liquefaction 
resistance of Zone 3 is three times the lower bound resistance of Zone 1. Sections 9 
and 10 present a summary of selected literature review and a simple tool provided to 
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the CCC for calculation of liquefaction-induced uplift of manholes. Finally Summary 
and Recommendations are presented in Section 11. A large number of appendices 
provide more details on each section, i.e. on lateral spreading (A), GIS analysis of the 
potable water system (B), liquefaction resistance index calculations (C), development 
of liquefaction zoning map of Christchurch (D), performance objective discussion 
document (E), lessons learned from the 1995 Kobe earthquake (F) and manhole uplift 
calculation tool (G). 
 
A concise version of this project is also provided in the form of an executive summary, 
including key recommendations and conclusions. 
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2 SEISMIC DEMAND IMPOSED BY THE 2010-2011 
EARTHQUAKES 
 
The 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake was caused by a rupture of a system of 
faults located to the west of Christchurch in the Canterbury Plains. The principal fault 
rupture (Greendale Fault) reached Rolleston or approximately 12 km from the west 
edge of the city and 18 km from its CBD. The 7.1 moment magnitude earthquake (Mw 
= 7.1) produced moderate to strong ground shaking within Christchurch with ground 
motions approaching the 475-design level in some period ranges.   
The 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake was caused by a local fault just 
beneath the Port Hills to the south of Christchurch. The fault was practically within 
the city boundaries and approximately 5km to the south-east of the CBD. The Mw = 
6.2 earthquake produced strong to very strong ground shaking within Christchurch 
with ground motions well above the 475-design level in the south, south-east and east 
suburbs of Christchurch as well as within the CBD. A number of factors such as the 
proximity of the fault to the city, rupture and wave propagation characteristics, and 
basin and site effects contributed to the very high ground motions. 
The observations and effects of these earthquakes must be kept in the context of these 
very high and damaging ground motions produced by these events, particularly the 22 
February 2011 earthquake. 
As seismic waves propagate through the softer alluvial soils, from the basement rock 
towards the ground surface, alluvial soils significantly modify the characteristics of 
ground shaking. They amplify the shaking and seismic forces for some structures, 
while for others they reduce, or de-amplify, the shaking. The composition of alluvial 
soils, their stratification, thickness and stiffness (resistance to deformation) define the 
particular features of the subsequent modification of the ground motion. In addition, 
as seismic waves pass through the soils, they deform the soils producing both 
transient deformations (temporary displacements) and permanent movements and 
deformations (residual horizontal and vertical displacements, ground distortion, 
undulation of ground surface, ground cracks and fissures). In cases when the ground 
deformation is excessive and seriously affecting the performance of land or structures, 
the soils are considered to have ‘failed’. Soil liquefaction is one form of such failure 
since it usually results in excessive ground deformation and displacement that 
severely affect the built environment. Lateral spreading is a particular phenomenon 
associated with liquefaction resulting in very large and damaging permanent ground 
displacements. 
The seismic loads acting on structures can be generally classified into two groups: 
inertial loads (caused by inertial forces due to shaking or seismic accelerations) and 
kinematic loads (due to ground movement). The former are critical for buildings and 
structures above the ground level, while the later are very important for structures 
buried in the ground, such as foundations or subsurface pipelines. In the case of 
liquefaction and lateral spreading, the earthquake-induced ground movements are 
very large, and hence, the consequent kinematic loads on buried structures can be 
significant and often beyond the available capacity to sustain such loads. 
To examine the seismic demand (inertial and kinematic loads) imposed by the two 
earthquakes, the distribution of the recorded peak ground accelerations (PGA), peak 
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ground velocities (PGV) and cyclic stress ratios (CSR) throughout Christchurch was 
first estimated (through direct GIS interpolation). Note that PGV and CSR are 
calculated using recorded acceleration time histories and PGAs respectively. 
 
2.1 Peak Ground Accelerations 
Records from 18 strong motion stations (SMS) were used in the presented analyses, 
13 of which are within the city boundaries. The geometric mean PGAs (i.e. square-
root of the product of the PGA recorded in two orthogonal horizontal directions) 
recorded during the two earthquakes are comparatively shown in Figure 1 indicating 
that generally much higher accelerations were recorded throughout Christchurch 
during the 22 February earthquake. At the stations to the west of Christchurch 
(Lincoln, Templeton, Rolleston) and in Kaiapoi, higher accelerations were recorded 
during the Darfield earthquake. The records at Papanui and Styx Mill show similar 
PGAs from both earthquakes. 
The distribution of the geometric mean PGAs throughout the city (obtained by 
ordinary krigging interpolation) is shown in Figure 2 (O’Rourke and Milashuk, 2011) 
for the 2010 Darfield, 2011 Christchurch and 13 June 2011 earthquakes, respectively. 
These plots clearly show the dominant effects of fault location on the recorded PGAs, 
but also the important influences of other factors as reflected in the scatter and 
variation of accelerations recorded at stations located within small distances from 
each other. It is known that high frequency content of ground shaking is highly 
variable even on small length scales due to wave scattering. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of geometric mean PGAs recorded during the 2010 Darfield earthquake 
(horizontal axis) and 2011 Christchurch earthquake (vertical axis); if two horizontal 
acceleration records were obtained in the NS and EW directions respectively, then the 
geometric mean PGA was calculated as 
EWNS PGAPGAPGAMeanGeom ⋅=.  
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(a) 4 September 2010 (Darfield) earthquake 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 22 February 2011 (Christchurch) earthquake 
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(c) 13 June 2011 earthquake 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of geometric mean PGAs obtained by ordinary krigging interpolation of 
recorded accelerations (O’Rourke and Milashuk, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Peak Ground Velocities 
The peak ground velocity (PGV) is a better measure for the ground motion intensity 
and its effects on buried structures which are subjected to substantial ground 
movement and deformation than PGA (Bradley et al. 2009). This is why design codes 
often employ PGV rather than PGA when correlating ground motion intensity and 
damage to pipe networks (e.g. ALA 2004). PGV is also much less sensitive to the 
aforementioned high frequency content variability in the ground motion, and hence it 
has a smaller spatial variability as compared to the PGA. Figure 3 summarizes the 
PGV calculated from recorded acceleration time histories and interpolated by krigging 
for the three major events (O’Rourke and Milashuk, 2011). 
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(a) 4 September 2010 (Darfield) earthquake 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 22 February 2011 (Christchurch) earthquake 
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(c) 13 June 2011 earthquake 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of geometric mean PGVs obtained by ordinary krigging interpolation of 
recorded accelerations (O’Rourke and Milashuk, 2011) 
 
 
2.3 Cyclic Stress Ratios 
In the simplified procedure for liquefaction evaluation (Seed and Idriss, 1971;Youd et 
al. 2001), the seismic demand (intensity of ground shaking) specific to liquefaction 
evaluation is defined by combining two key parameters of the ground motion, i.e. its 
amplitude and duration. The peak ground acceleration (PGA) is used as a measure for 
the amplitude of ground shaking while the earthquake moment magnitude (Mw) is 
used as a proxy for the duration of shaking (i.e. the number of significant stress 
cycles). By using this approach, it is possible to calculate the equivalent cyclic stress 
ratio, CSR7.5, at any given site and depth inf the PGA at the site and the magnitude of 
the causative earthquake were known. CSR7.5 in essence represents an equivalent 
amplitude of the shear stresses induced in the soil by the earthquake if they were to be 
expressed with 15 uniform stress cycles. The general form of the expression for 
CSR7.5 is shown below 
 
)M(f
)PGA(f
MSF
CSRCSRshakinggroundofIntensityNormalized
w
. === 57    (1) 
 
This approach allows for comparison of the intensity (severity) of ground shaking 
imposed by different earthquakes at a given site, or over a given area (for an adopted 
reference depth in the deposit). Using this approach, the CSR7.5 values induced by the 
4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes were calculated for each of the 
18 strong motion station (SMS) sites considered at the depth of the water table, as 
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shown comparatively in Figure 4. This plot shows that in the eastern and south-
eastern suburbs, and the CBD, the ground shaking intensity specific to liquefaction 
triggering was higher or much higher during the 22 February earthquake. In the 
western and north-western parts of Christchurch (e.g. Riccarton, Papanui and Styx 
Mill stations), the Darfield earthquake produced slightly more severe ground shaking 
(i.e. combined effects of amplitude and duration of shaking). At the HPSC station, 
PGAs and hence CSRs appear to be somewhat ‘anomalous’, probably due to 
dominant effects of very severe liquefaction affecting the strong motion instrument at 
the site. When evaluating the observed manifestation of liquefaction or non-
occurrence of liquefaction throughout different parts of Christchurch, it is important 
to have in mind these cyclic stress ratios because they demonstrate that different parts 
of the city were subjected to substantially different severity of ground shaking. For 
example, the severity of shaking at North New Brighton and Pages Road Pump 
stations was nearly three or four times the level of shaking experienced at the Papanui 
High School and Styx Mill Stations respectively. In general, the 4 September 
earthquake produced the maximum cyclic stress ratios in areas to the west and north-
west of the CBD, whereas the 22 February earthquake produced the maximum CSRs 
to the south, south-east, east and north-east of the CBD, and the CBD itself. As 
illustrated in Figure 5, there is a reasonably wide interface zone where both 
earthquakes produced CSRs of similar magnitude. 
Detailed analysis of the CSRs was further conducted to develop a liquefaction 
resistance map of Christchurch as described in the Liquefaction Resistance Index 
(LRI) section and Appendices C and D. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of equivalent cyclic stress ratios at water table depth, CSR7.5(wt), induced by 
the 2010 Darfield earthquake (horizontal axis) and 2011 Christchurch earthquake 
(vertical axis) computed using geometric mean horizontal PGAs recorded at SMS 
(SMS acronyms shown next tot each symbol) 
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Figure 5. Dominant earthquake event producing the maximum cyclic stress ratios or shaking 
intensity pertinent to liquefaction triggering; in the green area the highest CSRs were 
produced by the Darfield earthquake (4 SEP 2010) while the Christchurch earthquake 
(22 FEB 2011) produced the highest CSRs in the area shown in yellow 
 
2.4 Summary remarks 
Table 1 summarizes representative geometric mean PGA and PGV values, and 
CSR7.5(wt) values at water table depth for the CBD, eastern and western suburbs of 
Christchurch. It indicates the following: 
 
• The ground motions are characterized with high and damaging peak 
amplitudes, with horizontal PGA values of 0.18-0.674 g and horizontal PGV 
values of 27.6-72.8 cm/s. 
• When combining the peak amplitude with the number of significant cycles, 
moderate to high cyclic stress ratios (CSR7.5(wt)) were obtained for depths two 
metres below the water table. These stress ratios increase with depth as 
indicated in the footnote of Table 1. 
• All intensity measures are consistent and indicate that the intensity of the 
ground motion in the CBD and eastern suburbs was on average 1.5 to 2.0 
times that observed in the western suburbs during the 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake. Thus, any comparison of the performance of the water or 
wastewater networks must account for this difference in the seismic demand 
(different inertial and kinematic loads imposed by the earthquake in different 
parts of the city). 
• The PGA is proxy for the inertial loads imposed on rigid structures above the 
ground, PGV is proxy for the kinematic loads on buried structures due to 
ground movement while the CSR is proxy for the intensity of the motion with 
respect to liquefaction triggering. 
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Table 1. Summary of representative geometric mean PGA and PGV values, 
and cyclic stress ratios at water table depth (CSR7.5(wt)) for the CBD, eastern 
and western suburbs of Christchurch 
Ground motion 
intensity measure 
Western suburbs CBD Eastern suburbs 
gmPGA (g) 0.176-0.275 0.366 - 0.522 0.216 - 0.674 
gmPGV (cm/s) 27.6 - 36.7 46.3 - 65.4 35.1 – 72.8 
CSR7.5(wt) 0.100-0.125 0.146 - 0.209  0.251 - 0.269 
*) Note that, for example, CSR values at depths of 2m below the water table can 
be simply calculated by multiplying CSR7.5(wt) with 1.51, 1.33, 1.22, 1.16 or 1.11 
for water table depth of 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 or 5.0m. 
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3 SOIL LIQUEFACTION IN THE 2010-2011 
EARTHQUAKES 
 
Following the 22 February earthquake, an intensive drive-through reconnaissance was 
conducted through parts of Christchurch to document the severity and extent of 
liquefaction throughout the city. The drive-through survey aimed at capturing surface 
evidence of liquefaction as quickly as possible and quantifying its severity in a 
consistent and systematic manner. The resulting liquefaction map (Cubrinovski and 
Taylor, 2011) is shown in Figure 6 where four areas of different liquefaction severity 
are indicated: (a) moderate to severe liquefaction (red zone, with very large areas 
covered by sand ejecta, mud and water, large distortion of ground and pavement 
surfaces, large fissures in the ground, and significant liquefaction-induced impacts on 
buildings and infrastructure), (b) low to moderate liquefaction (yellow zone, with 
generally similar features as for the severe liquefaction, but of lesser intensity and 
extent), (c) liquefaction predominantly on roads with some on properties (magenta 
zone, where heavy effects of liquefaction were seen predominantly on roads, with 
large sinkholes and ‘vents’ for pore pressure dissipation, and limited damage to 
properties/houses), and (d) traces of liquefaction (red circular symbols, with clear 
signs of liquefaction, but limited in extent and deemed not damaging for structures). 
The solid blue lines indicate roads where no signs of liquefaction were observed. The 
suburbs to the east of CBD along Avon River (Avonside, Dallington, Avondale, 
Burwood and Bexley) were most severely affected by liquefaction, which coincides 
with the area where about 5000 residential properties will be abandoned (New 
Zealand Government, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Liquefaction map of Christchurch from drive-through reconnaissance (Cubrinovski 
and Taylor, 2011); the map is incomplete (i.e. does not cover all of Christchurch) and 
shows only general overlay of areas (i.e. it cannot be used on property basis)  
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Ten days after the earthquake, after the urban search and rescue efforts had largely 
finished, a comprehensive ground survey was initiated within the CBD to document 
liquefaction effects in this area. Figure 7 shows the resulting liquefaction 
documentation map for the CBD together with the prevalent soil types in the top 7-8 
m of the deposits (Cubrinovski and McCahon, 2011). The principal zone of 
liquefaction (shown in red) stretches west to east through the CBD, from Hagley Park 
to the west, along the Avon River to the northeast boundary of the CBD at the 
Fitzgerald Bridge. Many high-rise buildings on shallow foundations and deep 
foundations were affected by the liquefaction in different ways. Note that this zone 
consists mostly of sandy soils and largely coincides with the path of the Avon River 
and the network of old streams depicted in the 1850s survey maps (Archives New 
Zealand (2011)). Another zone of moderate to severe liquefaction was found in the 
south-east part of the CBD, though its effects were less significant in relative terms. 
It is important to emphasize that in the maps shown in Figures 6 and 7 the 
manifestation (severity) of liquefaction even within one zone was not uniform, but 
rather varied substantially. In the red zone within the CBD, for example, the 
manifestation of liquefaction was primarily of moderate intensity with relatively 
extensive areas and volumes of sand/silt ejecta. There were also areas of low 
manifestation or only traces of liquefaction, but also pockets of severe liquefaction 
with very pronounced ground distortion, fissures, large settlements and substantial 
lateral ground movements. The zones of more pronounced liquefaction and ground 
distortion (black solid line and area) do appear somewhat to “line up” with the old 
stream channels, which sheds some light on the reasons for variability in liquefaction 
manifestation. One should not expect though that all liquefaction features and zones 
of pronounced ground weakness could be explained with reference to the stream 
channels dating back to 1850s, because the earlier history including deposition and re-
working of surficial soils is also highly relevant for their liquefaction susceptibility. 
 
 
  
Figure 7.  Liquefaction map indicating zones (in general terms, not on property basis) within the 
CBD affected by liquefaction in the 22 February earthquake (Cubrinovski and Taylor, 
2011); predominant soils in the top part of the deposits are also indicated (Cubrinovski 
and McCahon, 2011) 
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In this sense, the liquefaction maps are generalized (both spatially and in terms of 
severity) and certainly are not applicable on a property basis. They do provide 
however a good basis for city-wide zoning based on actual observations of the ground 
performance during strong earthquakes and ground shaking. The map shown in Figure 
6 is also not complete, because only the coloured areas were covered in the ground 
surveying, which was biased towards the areas affected by liquefaction. 
Soil liquefaction repeatedly occurred in the same areas (i.e. at the same sites) during 
the multiple earthquakes producing strong ground shaking in Christchurch, and in 
particular during the 4 September 2010, 22 February 2011, and 13 June 2011 
earthquakes. Figure 8 comparatively shows liquefied areas of Christchurch in these 
three events, as documented by field inspections. 
The 22 February earthquake produced the most severe and widespread liquefaction 
within Christchurch which is consistent with the produced severity of ground shaking 
as described in terms of CSR7.5 in the previous section. Again, consistent with the 
simplified procedure for liquefaction evaluation, in areas where the 4 September 
earthquake produced the highest CSRs (e.g. Kaiapoi and Halswell), the liquefaction 
manifestation was the most severe during the September 2010 earthquake. 
The repeated occurrence of liquefaction at a given site during an earthquake is not 
surprising because liquefaction generally does not increase the liquefaction resistance 
of soils and hence does not prevent occurrence of soil liquefaction (re-liquefaction) at 
a site in subsequent earthquakes. The sequence of events in Christchurch has certainly 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Liquefaction maps documenting areas of observed liquefaction in the 4 September 
2010 (white contours), 22 February 2011 (red, yellow, magenta areas; Cubrinovski 
and Taylor, 2011), and 13 June 2011 (black contours; Cubrinovski and Hughes, 
2011) earthquakes; note that only parts of Christchurch were surveyed, and that the 
aim of the surveys was to capture general features and areas affected by liquefaction 
as observed from the roads, hence, the zoning is not applicable to specific properties 
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proven this notion. The repeated liquefaction was often quite severe and some 
residents reported that the liquefaction severity increased in subsequent events. Again 
this type of behaviour is not surprising if one carefully considers the intensity and 
volatility of soil liquefaction process, and the characteristics of the re-solidified soil 
deposits post-liquefaction. 
 
Soil liquefaction is a process in which over a very short period of time (several 
seconds or tens of seconds) during strong ground shaking, the soil transforms from 
its normal solid state into a heavy liquid mass. As a consequence of liquefaction, 
the soil essentially loses its strength and bearing capacity (i.e. the capacity to 
support gravity loads of heavy structures), thus causing sinking of heavy structures 
into the ground. Conversely, light and buoyant structures (that have smaller mass 
density than the liquefied soil mass) will be uplifted and float above the surface. 
Ground deformation associated with liquefaction takes various forms and is often 
excessive, non-uniform and involves large permanent vertical displacements 
(settlement) and lateral displacements commonly resulting in large cracks and 
fissures in the ground, substantial ground distortion and sand/silt/water ejecta 
covering the ground surface. The large pressures created in the groundwater 
during liquefaction are in excess of the equilibrium pressures, thus triggering flow 
of water towards the ground surface. Since these water pressures are very high, the 
water will carry a significant amount of soil on its way towards the ground surface 
and eject this on the ground surface. This process inevitably leads to loosening of 
some parts of the foundation soils and often results in creation of local ‘collapse 
zones’, sinkholes and ‘vents’ for pore pressure dissipation and flow of pore water 
(Cubrinovski and McCahon, 2011). 
 
The soil fabric of the re-solidified deposits post-liquefaction, is very ‘weak’, with low 
liquefaction resistance. Hence, even though in some cases parts of the deposit might 
have been slightly densified as a consequence of liquefaction, it would be misleading 
and very unconservative to assume that the liquefaction resistance of such soils has 
increased. One could assume that sites and areas that exhibited relatively severe 
liquefaction repeatedly indeed have low to very low liquefaction resistance and 
should be considered of high liquefaction potential in future earthquakes if no 
countermeasures against liquefaction are implemented. Using the recorded ground 
motions and liquefaction observations from the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake 
sequence, an approximate liquefaction resistance map for regional zoning is 
developed and presented in Section 8. 
 
3.1 Lateral Spreading 
Lateral spreading typically occurs in sloping ground or level ground close to 
waterways/open face (e.g. river banks, streams, in the backfills behind quay walls). 
Even a very gentle slope in the ground (of just few degrees) will create a bias in the 
cyclic loads acting on the soil mass during earthquakes which will drive the soil to 
move in the down-slope direction. If the underlying soils liquefy then the liquefied 
soil mass (‘heavy liquid’) will naturally move down-slope and will continue this 
movement until equilibrium is re-established (or resisting forces reach the level of 
driving forces). The process of spreading in backfills behind retaining walls is similar, 
with large ground shaking first displacing the retaining structure outwards (e.g. 
towards the waterway), which is then followed by lateral spreading in the backfills. 
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The temporal evolution of lateral spreading is closely related to the development of 
excess pore water pressures and soil liquefaction in the spreading deposit. While 
spreading due to the biased seismic loads might be initiated at the early stages of 
strong shaking during the pore pressure build-up, the magnitude of lateral spreading 
displacements will increase substantially once the soils liquefy, because soil 
liquefaction will dramatically reduce the stiffness and strength of soils and will reduce 
their shear resistance to levels below the amplitude of the driving shear stresses. The 
spreading may continue even after the strong shaking has diminished and is 
influenced by a number of factors such as the available soil resistance (soil properties 
and in-situ state), driving stresses (topography, and ground motion characteristics), 
dissipation of excess pore water pressures (dynamic permeability and water flow 
conditions) and magnitude of lateral displacements (change of overall soil volume 
during spreading). Clearly a complex interplay of the topography, soil characteristics 
and conditions, temporal and spatial development of pore pressures and strains in the 
ground during cyclic loading, residual strength and stiffness of liquefied soils, 
conditions for dissipation of excess pore water pressures, mode of deformation and 
characteristics of ground motion (earthquake loads) is affecting lateral spreading. 
Following the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes, field 
measurements of lateral spreading were conducted by means of the ground surveying 
method at approximately 120 locations along Avon River in the affected area. Some 
details of the measured displacements, characteristics of lateral spreading and its 
impacts on buildings and infrastructure are given in the appended paper (Cubrinovski 
et al., 2012; Appendix A). In this section, a very brief discussion and excerpts from 
this document is given. 
Figure 9 shows measured lateral spreading displacements along Avon River in 
Dallington due to the 4 September 2010 earthquake. They illustrate that at some 
locations the banks of the river moved laterally as much as two metres. The 
magnitude of spreading displacement typically decreases with the distance form the 
waterway and the spreading extended up to a distance of 100-250 m from the 
waterway.  
 
 
Figure 9.  Permanent lateral ground displacements due to spreading along Avon River in 
Dallington caused by the 4 September 2010 earthquake (plotted as a function of the 
distance from the waterway) 
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After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the ground surveying measurements were 
repeated at 25 locations to quantify the additional lateral ground movements due to 
spreading induced by the February event. Figure 10 comparatively shows the 
spreading displacements induced by the two earthquakes at nine locations along Avon 
River. Here the horizontal axis indicates the displacement induced by the 4 September 
2010 earthquake while the vertical axis indicates the cumulative displacements due to 
both earthquakes. The contribution of all aftershocks preceding the 13 June 
earthquakes to the cumulative displacements shown in the vertical axis is considered 
negligible. The results indicate that the lateral spreading displacements along Avon 
River induced by the 22 February 2011 earthquake where of similar magnitude with 
those induced by the 4 September 2010 earthquake. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Comparison of permanent lateral ground displacements along Avon River (Avonside, 
Dallington, Bexley) caused by the 4 September 2010 earthquake (horizontal axis) and 
cumulative displacements due to the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
earthquakes (vertical axis) 
 
 
Lateral spreading involves large lateral ground movement at/near open faces (banks 
of waterways), but also substantial differential displacements in the direction of 
spreading resulting in large extensional deformation and ground fissuring. For 
example, the equivalent extensional strains in the zone of largest ground cracks were 
on the order of 5-10% while the ‘average’ extensional strains in the area affected by 
spreading were approximately 0.5-1.0%. The spreading was often accompanied by 
slumping of the soils near the banks (large settlement/subsidence), which was 
particularly noticeable at the approaches of bridges. Both lateral and vertical ground 
displacements induced by spreading where spatially non-uniform resulting in large 
localized deformation, stretching, tensile cracking and shearing of the ground. The 
non-uniformity of the ground deformation was further exacerbated by the spatial 
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variability in the severity of liquefaction as well as the influence of soil-structure 
interaction on the movement, deformations and flow of water during dissipation of 
excess pore water pressures. Finally, as implied in the description of the mechanism 
of lateral spreading, spreading-induced loads involve combined inertial (due to 
accelerations) and kinematic (due to ground movement) effects, the characteristics of 
which depend on the evolution of the lateral spreading process in relation to the 
particular acceleration time history (ground motion at the site) and the site/soil 
response. Clearly, engineering structures that were located within the spreading zone 
were subjected  to very large and highly non-uniform (both spatially and temporally) 
ground deformation and seismic forces which were more often than not above the 
available capacity to sustain such movements/loads, hence resulting in substantial and 
widespread damage to buildings and infrastructure. 
Starting from the Colombo St Bridge, practically all bridges downstream Avon River 
were severely impacted by lateral spreading.  Rotational movements of abutments, 
damage to foundation piles, subsidence of approaches to bridges and in some cases 
structural damage were the most typical spreading-induced damage to bridges. 
Typical damage pattern for bridges is illustrated in Appendix A. 
Buried structures were subjected to very large and variable kinematic loads within 
relatively short distances. For example, a pipeline segment of about 50 m located 
within the spreading zone could experience large differential lateral ground movement 
on the order of 0.5 – 1.0 m and similar level of differential settlement of the ground. 
In addition, parts of the pipeline and adjacent manholes may have experienced uplift 
due to liquefaction-induced buoyant pressures. The loads on the pipeline and 
particular modes of deformation depended on the particular layout of the pipeline with 
respect to the spreading direction and ground movements (parallel, perpendicular or at 
angle to the spreading). 
A wide range and variation of maximum spreading displacements was measured even 
within a given area illustrating the complex influence and interplay of various factors 
affecting lateral spreading. The spreading was often very pronounced and of large 
magnitude in point bar deposits, but much smaller at the cut-banks on the opposite 
side of the river. Old river channels, streams and gullies, and artificial infilling of 
wetland areas during the European settlement have also contributed to the variability 
and complexity in the manifestation of lateral spreading. Along Avon River, the 
meandering loops (present and past) and topography were affecting the spreading in a 
very complex way. This is apparent in the pre-earthquake ground elevation map 
shown in Figure 11 (Landcare Research 2011) where elevation above sea level is 
indicated. Clearly, the ground is sloping towards the Avon River, though the slopes 
are very gentle and generally less than 1.5 degrees (2.6 %), and hence the bias in the 
cyclic load due to the sloping ground is relatively small. 
In addition to the ‘localized spreading’ along waterways, there are indications from 
aerial observations (aerial photogrammetry and LiDAR) that global patterns of 
spreading driven by topographic and geometry conditions may have occurred. Such 
spreading movements may have involved quite large areas but they do not induce 
large localized strains and deformations at shallow depths, and hence are much less 
damaging to the water and wastewater systems than the differential spreading 
movements along waterways described above. Further investigations of the global 
patterns of spreading are currently under way (Tonkin and Taylor, 2011). 
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Figure 11. Pre-earthquakes ground elevation above sea level along Avon River, from the CBD 
to the estuary (derived from the Digital Elevation Model of Christchurch, 
Landcare Research, 2011) 
 
 
3.2 Summary remarks 
 
• Widespread and severe liquefaction occurred in the suburbs of Christchurch 
and its CBD. Such extensiveness and severity of liquefaction in native soils is 
exceptional by international standards. 
• The repeated and very severe liquefaction particularly along the Avon River 
and in some other localized areas, clearly indicate that such soils have very 
low liquefaction resistance. There are several contributing factors to such low 
resistance: 
i) By composition and their plasticity, (non-plastic sands, silty sands, 
sandy silts, and silt-sand-gravel mixtures) the soils are highly 
susceptible to liquefaction. 
ii) Their in situ state (conditions) including full saturation (high water 
table), medium or loose to very loose density and fluvial deposits 
fabric (granular structure of river deposits) all point out to a high 
liquefaction potential.  
iii) The soils are relatively young and apparently free of any serious aging 
effects, which again suggests a low liquefaction resistance.  
iv) The groundwater regime of Christchurch is exceptional with 
significant groundwater flow through aquifers and many wells and 
natural springs in the area. The artesian pressure and upward water 
flow reduce the effective stress in the subsurface soils and reduce 
(eliminate) the possibility for soils to get stiffer and stronger due to 
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aging effects. Liquefaction resistance is known to increase with the age 
of soils due to changes in their micro-structure and cementation (aging 
effect). We speculate that such aging effects on soils could not develop 
in the Christchurch groundwater environment. 
v) Finally, we have to emphasize again that the severity of ground 
shaking together with the aforementioned factors also played key role 
in the severity and extensiveness of the induced liquefaction. 
Preliminary analyses suggest that liquefaction impacts of an Mw=8.0 
Alpine Fault earthquake will be much less severe than those of the 22 
February 2011 earthquake.   
3) Ground surveying measurements at approximately 80 locations along Avon 
River indicate maximum (relative) magnitudes of permanent lateral ground 
displacements due to spreading of liquefied soils on the order of 1.0 – 2.0 m. 
The spreading typically extended inland up to a distance of 100 m to 250 m 
from the waterway. 
4) Different spreading patterns and distribution of lateral displacements with 
distance from the waterway were observed in North Kaiapoi, South Kaiapoi 
and along Avon River in Christchurch. In addition to the more conventional 
‘exponential decay’ distribution where the spreading displacements rapidly 
decrease with the distance from the waterway, a block-mode failure was 
observed in South Kaiapoi with the largest and very damaging ground fissures 
opening at a distance of approximately 125-250 m from the waterway. The 
spreading along the meandering loops of Avon River showed very complex 
pattern and was affected by the interplay of soil conditions, topography, river 
geometry and local depositional environment. 
5) The spreading induced very large and non-uniform ground 
deformation/displacements in the affected zone severely impacting 
infrastructure in the area. Road bridges suffered consistent spreading-induced 
damage and deformation mechanism including rotation of the abutments 
associated with deck pinning and damage at the top of the piles. Slumping of 
the approaches was also typical damage feature at locations of large lateral 
spreads. Loss of grade in gravity pipes, breakage of brittle pipes, failure of 
joints and connections were typical failures in potable water and wastewater 
pipe networks of Christchurch. 
6) When evaluating lateral spreading one should carefully consider ground 
elevation (direction of sloping), river geometry (meandering, loops, cutbanks, 
point bar deposits), presence of weakened zones (old river channels, fills, etc.) 
and geotechnical conditions, next develop lateral spreading zoning and 
probable range of spreading displacements and their distribution, and then 
anticipate loads and deformation of the pipeline having in mind its particular 
layout relative to the direction of lateral spreading. 
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4 PERFORMANCE OF THE POTABLE WATER 
SYSTEM  
4.1 Main characteristics of the potable water system 
The Christchurch water supply system is an integrated citywide network that sources 
high quality groundwater from confined aquifers, and pumps the water into a 
distribution pipe network throughout the city consisting of 1600 km of watermains 
and 2000 km of submains (CCC 2010a).  
The water is supplied from approximately 150 wells at over 50 sites, 8 main storage 
reservoirs, 37 service reservoirs and 26 secondary pumping stations. The system is 
divided into distinct pressure zones and uses bulk storage reservoirs to assist in 
meeting peak demands and providing for emergencies. The wells and pumping 
stations are evenly distributed throughout the city, providing efficient delivery of 
water at a relatively uniform pressure within each zone. Secondary pumping stations 
and reservoirs are used in areas of undulating terrain (e.g. Port Hills). The system is 
centrally controlled from the main wastewater treatment plant. 
Watermains and submains are located almost exclusively within legal roads, at 
shallow depths. The preferred location for principal watermains is in the carriageway, 
about 2.0-2.5 m from the kerb. Submains are typically installed beneath footpaths 
approximately 150mm from boundaries. Submains are served from crossovers which 
are usually located at fire hydrants. All crossovers are 50mm in diameter regardless of 
the submain size, with the preferred connection into either a tapped hydrant riser or 
into the main at a hydrant tee. The system is designed so that turning off a maximum 
of five valves can isolate any area in the network that serves no more than 50 
properties. A typical layout of watermains and submains is shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Typical layout of watermains and submains in the carriageways and footpaths of 
Christchurch streets (CCC, 2010a) 
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Standard diameters of watermains are 100 mm to 600 mm, while submains have 
diameters of 50 mm and 63 mm. Watermains are laid in trenches 200-300 mm wider 
than the pipe diameter, at relatively shallow depths. The cover thickness depends on 
the pipe size, location and material, but is usually about 800mm (at least 750mm, but 
no more than 1.5m for the standard watermains diameters). Typical thickness of cover 
for submains is 300-500 mm. The trenches are backfilled with native soils and are 
compacted to 95%, 90% and 70% of the material’s maximum dry density (NZS 
4402.4.1.1) for trafficked, pedestrian and landscape areas, respectively. Note that the 
backfill excludes haunching and bedding, for which as indicated in Figure 13 AP20 
material is used (sandy gravel with at least 55% gravel size particles and 8-15% fines). 
A GIS layout of the watermains network is shown in Figure 14 in which three 
different colours are used to distinguish between different pipe materials: polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) pipes (green), polyethylene (PE) pipes (magenta) and other material 
pipes (grey). As indicated with the pie chart in the inset of the figure, out of the 
1511km pipe length (covered in the analysis excluding the hills), 797km, or 52.7%, of 
the watermains are asbestos cement (AC) pipes; 398km, or 26.4%, are PVC pipes; 
27km, or 1.8%, are steel pipes; only 15km, or nearly 1.0%, are PE pipes (which as 
illustrated subsequently are the most robust regarding liquefaction-induced ground 
deformations); and 273km, or 18.1%, are pipes made of other materials. The stated 
percentages and distribution of materials comprising the watermains system reflects 
various phases in the historical development of the system and selection of pipe 
materials. In recent years, three pipe materials have been used for watermains: ductile 
iron, PVC and PE, with a number of criteria being used in the selection of the pipe 
material (CCC, 2010a). 
The submains network predominantly consists of PE pipes with a pipe length of 
1318km, or 84.6%, out of the total length of 1557km, with PVC pipes and Galvanized 
Iron (GI) having 52.3km and 161.9km, or 3.3% and 10.4%, of the total length, 
respectively (Figure 15). 
 
 
   
Figure 13. Schematic illustration of backfill and pipe-laying details (units in mm)
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Figure 14. Christchurch watermains network indicating different pipe materials (location and length of prevalent or relevant materials from a resilience perspective) 
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Figure 15. Christchurch submains network (PE pipes cover approximately 85% of pipe length) 
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The water supply network is designed for an asset life of 100 years, which is also the 
minimum required design life of the pipes and fittings. The Infrastructure Design 
Standard (CCC, 2010a) stipulates that  
“all structures must be designed with adequate flexibility and special provisions to minimise risk 
of damage during earthquakes” and to ”provide flexible joints and isolation valves at all junctions 
between rigid structures (e.g. reservoirs, pump stations, bridges, buildings, manholes) and natural 
or made ground”. 
There are no provisions specific to soil liquefaction in the aforementioned 
Infrastructure Design Standard. 
 
4.2 Performance of the potable water system (PWS) in the 
2010-2011 earthquakes 
To rigorously evaluate the performance of the potable water system, at least three 
levels of analyses are envisioned for the pipe network within the GIS framework. 
Ideally, each analysis level should be applied to individual major seismic events, such 
as the 4 September 2010, 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011 earthquakes. The three 
levels of analyses are: 
1. Level 1 Analysis (L1A), which provides assessment of the performance of 
different pipe materials and associated design/construction details. In its 
simplest form (presented in this report), this analysis allows a comparison of 
the repair/break rates for different pipe materials. A more rigorous approach 
would allow us to discriminate between different types of failures/breaks, and 
hence, to identify the particular design, construction, and material details that 
contributed the most to the network damage. It is critically important to collect 
further data and conduct this more rigorous analysis in order to develop an 
enhanced understanding of  the performance of the potable water system in the 
2010-2011 earthquakes. 
2. Level Two Analysis (L2A), is equivalent to LA1 except that it focuses on 
correlating the network damage with the observed liquefaction severity (land 
damage). Again, several levels of rigour could be used for LA2. In addition to 
discriminating between different failure types as mentioned for LA1, the 
severity of liquefaction or land damage (ground deformation) can be expressed 
either in simple qualitative terms (presented in this report) or in terms of 
quantitative measures of ground movement such as PGV or 
transient/permanent ground displacements (lateral displacements and 
settlements). 
3. Level Three Analysis (L3A), which uses geological and geotechnical data (i.e. 
SPT, CPT and Vs from field data, and laboratory soil data from 
physical/deformational tests) to estimate liquefaction potential and consequent 
ground deformation, and then correlate the predicted land damage with the 
actually observed pipe network damage. This approach allows to develop 
predictive models for seismic performance of potable water networks that 
could be applied to areas with similar ground conditions within Christchurch 
that were not subjected to very severe ground shaking or to areas outside of 
Christchurch. 
 
Summary of the applied analysis methodology and results of LA1 and LA2 are 
presented below whereas more details of the analyses and results are given in 
Appendix B.  
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Data and Methodology 
The Council provided the water supply Geographic Information System (GIS) layer 
through their Web Features Service. Attribute information included pipe segment 
unique identifiers, year of pipe installation, pipe lengths, diameters, depths and 
materials. Five pipe materials were separately considered in the analyses: polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC), polyethylene (PE), steel (S), galvanised iron (GI) and asbestos 
cement (AC). All other materials were lumped in the category “other materials”. L1 
and L2 Analyses were conducted on watermains and submains networks, using repair 
data for the three major earthquakes. This summary provides the analyses results only 
for the 22 February 2011 earthquake, which as previously mentioned inflicted the 
largest network damage. The analyses were carried out in their simplest form (due to 
lack of data and time), and hence, types of failures were not differentiated and 
liquefaction effects were not rigorously quantified. 
One of the key issues encountered in the repairs data was that often several repairs 
were lumped into a single record (repair point, CCC, 2011), thus making it impossible 
to identify the exact number of repairs. In addition, the description of repairs was 
either not sufficient or not presented in a readily available format for analysis. In this 
context, the presented analyses and results should be considered as preliminary and as 
a work-in-progress. However, we do not anticipate significant changes in the 
figures/results presented herein, and hence they should be treated as representative for 
early decision-making. The data used in the analyses presented herein was for the 
period “February to June”, and was assumed to include the repairs carried out in the 
period 23 February 2011 to 12 June 2011. 
Using GIS tools, the total length of pipes, lengths of different pipe materials, lengths 
of pipes in areas of different liquefaction severity and number of repairs per unit 
length were calculated and then used in further statistical analysis. The L2 Analysis 
was conducted only for the area covered in the drive-through ground surveying shown 
in Figure 6, in order to compare rigorously the performance of the network across 
areas with similar seismic demand but with different liquefaction severity including 
areas of no liquefaction. 
 
Level 1 Analysis Results for Watermains 
Figure 16 shows the location of repairs/faults on the watermains network following 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake. In the background GIS layer the pipe materials are 
indicated with different colours. In the inset of the figure, the performance of different 
pipe materials is summarized with a bar chart (for areas in the plains, excluding the 
hills). It shows that 5.1% of the total length of watermains was damaged, or 77.5 km 
out of 1511 km considered in the analysis. Steel pipes suffered the largest damage 
(8.9%), followed by AC pipes and other material pipes (6.1% and 6.8%, respectively), 
whereas much better performing were the PVC (1.8%) and PE (0.5%) pipes. The 
results of the analyses are summarized in Table 2.  It is noted that the sample lengths 
of PE and S pipes are considered insufficient for a robust statistical analysis and hence 
the respective results should be treated with caution. 
 
Level 2 Analysis Results for Watermains 
Figure 17 shows the same repairs/faults data for the watermains network and 22 
February earthquake with the liquefaction map (Figure 6) shown in the background. 
Using this setup in the GIS framework, it was possible to calculate and correlate the 
pipe damage with the observed severity of liquefaction. The pie chart shown in the 
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inset of Figure 17 indicates that 34 km of the damaged pipes or 58% of the damaged 
length in the area covered by ground surveying (Figure 6) was in areas of moderate to 
severe liquefaction, 20.2% were in areas of low to moderate liquefaction, 2.5 % in 
areas where traces of liquefaction were observed and 19.3% in areas where no signs 
of liquefaction were observed. Hence, there is a clear link between liquefaction 
severity and damage to the pipe network. To further scrutinize the correlation between 
the damage to pipes and liquefaction severity, the results are summarized separately 
for different materials in Table 2 and with a series of bar charts shown in Figure 18. 
These results indicate the following: 
• For all pipe materials except PE pipes, there is a clear increase in the 
affected length (percentage of damage) with increasing liquefaction 
severity 
• For S, AC and other materials pipes, the percentage of damaged pipes in 
areas of severe liquefaction was very high, between 15% and 22%. 
• PVC pipes suffered two to four times less damage than S, AC and other 
material pipes 
• There is an indication that PE pipes performed well though the sample is 
too small for any definitive conclusions. For the same reason, the 
“anomalous” result obtained should be ignored until data and 
details/reasons for the failure/repair of the short pipe segment of PE pipe in 
the no liquefaction area are available/clarified.  
• The level of pipe damage in no liquefaction and not inspected areas are 
similar indicating that ground displacements/performance were similar in 
these areas (with general absence of liquefaction manifestation). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Results of Level 1 and Level 2 Analyses for the Christchurch watermains network, 
using repairs/faults data for the 22 February 2011 Earthquake 
Damaged length 
Level 2 Analysis Level 1 Analysis 
Pipe 
material 
Total 
length 
(km) Severe 
Liquefaction, 
in km & (%) 
Low-Mod. 
Liquefaction, 
in km & (%) 
Traces, 
in km & 
(%) 
No 
Liquefaction, 
in km & (%) 
Not 
inspected, 
in km & (%) 
Total 
length, 
km 
Damaged 
length  
(%) 
PVC 398.4 3.8  
(7.9) 
1.1  
(3.7) 
0  
(0) 
0.5  
(0.73) 
1.8  
(0.72) 
7.2 1.8 
PE 14.6 0  
(0) 
0  
(0) 
0  
(0) 
0.07  
(2.7) 
0  
(0) 
0.07 0.5 
S 27.3 1.0 
 (20.7) 
0.5  
(17.6) 
0.04 
(5.3) 
0.3  
(6.5)  
0.6  
(4.1) 
2.4 8.9 
AC 797.2 20.2  
(22.1) 
7.9 
(10.6) 
1.0 
(9.9) 
8.0 
(5.8) 
12.0 
(2.5) 
49.1 6.1 
Other 273.5 9.0 
(15.4) 
2.3 
(7.8) 
0.4 
(11.4) 
2.5 
(3.3) 
4.5 
(4.2) 
18.7 6.8 
*)  Figures in brackets indicate percentage of damaged pipes within the particular class 
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Figure 16. Locations of repairs/faults (indicated by red symbols) on the Christchurch watermains network following the 22 February 2011 earthquake 
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Figure 17. Locations of repairs/faults (red symbols) on the Christchurch watermains network and areas of liquefaction following the 22 February 2011 earthquake
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Figure 18. Percentage of length damaged for water mains due to the 22 February earthquake, 
for different pipe materials and liquefaction severity (dashed red lines represent the 
average affected length across all ground damage levels). 
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Analysis Results for Submains 
An equivalent analysis was conducted for submains, the results of which are 
summarized in Table 3. and Figures 19, 20 and 21. The key results from these 
analyses can be summarized as follows: 
 
• For PE pipes, the percentage of damaged length ranged between 1.4% (not 
inspected areas) and 5.2% (Areas of severe liquefaction). Again, there was 
a clear increase in damage with liquefaction severity. 
• PE pipes suffered, on average, five to six times less damage than GI pipes. 
• GI pipes performed poorly with 17% damaged length in areas of low to 
moderate liquefaction and 26% in areas of severe liquefaction. 
• For PVC pipes, the percentage of damaged length ranged between 2% and 
3% (for non-liquefied and severe liquefaction areas respectively). 
However, the PVC pipes sample size was insufficient and hence the PVC 
submains results should be treated with caution. 
• Comparing the damage to watermains and submains, it appears that for 
each pipe material the damage to the submains was larger than the damage 
to the mains. The total damaged length of submains was smaller, however, 
because over 80% of the submains were comprised of the well performing 
PE pipes. 
• Even though in this simplest form of the analysis the damage is always 
associated to a certain pipe material, the nominally defined “failures” 
include (and probably are dominated at least for the PE pipes) by failures 
of particular components (joints, connections, fire hydrant details, 
crossovers, laterals) rather than material failures. It is critically important 
therefore to discriminate between different types of failure and carry out a 
more rigorous second stage of analysis, which will help to identify key 
weaknesses and also “good design/construction details/characteristics” of 
the Christchurch potable water system that was subjected to the series of 
severe earthquakes. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results of Level 1 and Level 2 Analyses for the Christchurch submains network, 
using repairs/faults data for the 22 February 2011 Earthquake 
Damaged length Pipe 
material 
Total 
length 
(km) 
Severe 
Liquefaction, 
in km & (%) 
Low-Mod. 
Liquefaction, 
in km & (%) 
Traces, 
in km & 
(%) 
No 
Liquefaction, 
in km & (%) 
Not 
inspected, 
in km & (%) 
Total 
length, 
km 
Damaged 
length  
(%) 
PVC 52.3 0.1  
(2.9) 
0.04  
(2.6) 
0  
(0) 
0.05  
(1.6) 
1.0  
(2.2) 
1.2 2.3 
PE 1318 11.3  
(5.2) 
5.2  
(4.5) 
0.4  
(2.5) 
6.8  
(2.6) 
9.4  
(1.4) 
33.1 2.5 
GI 162 9.3  
(26.1) 
4.8  
(17.0) 
0.05  
(5.5) 
4.5  
(11.7) 
5.4  
(9.2) 
24 14.8 
Other 25.4 0.23  
(16.4) 
0.09  
(4.7) 
0  
(0) 
0.02  
(2.8) 
0.45  
(1.2) 
0.79 3.1 
*)  Figures in brackets indicate percentage of damaged pipes within the particular class 
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Figure 19. Locations of repairs/faults (red symbols) on the Christchurch submains network following the 22 February 2011 earthquake 
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Figure 20. Locations of repairs/faults (red symbols) on the Christchurch submains network and areas of liquefaction following the 22 February 2011 earthquake
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Figure 21. Percentage of length damaged for submains due to the 22 February earthquake, for 
different pipe materials and liquefaction severity (dashed red lines represent the 
average affected length across all ground damage levels). 
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5 PERFORMANCE OF THE WASTEWATER SYSTEM 
5.1 Main characteristics of the wastewater system 
 
The terrain of Christchurch (excluding the hills to the south) is very flat with an 
average slope of approximately 0.1 – 0.2% from the west part of the city towards the 
coastline to the east. For this reason, the Christchurch wastewater system differs from 
most of other cities in New Zealand: it makes extensive use of flatter grades than 
normal sewer grades and also a large number of pumping stations. The flat grades 
often result in velocities significantly lower than the widely used self-flashing 
velocity of 0.7 m/s. The system consists of a citywide network of about 1800 km of 
pipes that collect and transport the wastewater to the Bromley treatment plant. 
Before the earthquake, on average, the system was considered in a good condition 
despite its age. It is interesting though that infiltration (entry of subsurface water) and 
inflow (entry of surface water) together accounted for approximately one third of the 
annual wastewater flow. This fact should be considered in the context of the very 
intense surface water flow and groundwater regime of Christchurch. 
Wastewater pipes are laid in the centre of the road with minimum vertical cover of 1.2 
m. Gravity pipes are laid in straight lines and at a constant gradient between access 
points (manholes and inspection chambers). The minimum size of private sewers is 
100 mm. Majority of the pipes are at depths between 2.0 m and 3.5 m. 
The maximum spacing between manholes is from 100 m (for D = 150 – 225 mm 
pipes) to 180 m (for D ≥ 1600 mm pipes). Two types of manholes have been used: 
cast in situ square shape manholes (an older version of the manholes), while the new 
version of the manholes is a lighter precast circular in shape manhole. The design 
factor of safety against floating is set at FS ≥ 1.2 assuming an empty manhole, fully 
saturated soil and no contribution of skin friction. 
The trenches for the pipes are 300 mm wider than the external diameter of the pipe. 
Haunching and surrounding soils are compacted to 95% maximum dry density using 
AP40 and AP20 materials. Approved geotextile is used to protect the haunching and 
pipe foundation soils from infiltration of surrounding soils and backfills. 
The existing pipe materials and their distribution throughout the city reflect various 
phases and preferred choice of materials in the historical development of the city and 
the system. Current specifications (CCC, 2010a; CCC, 2010b) indicate that PVC, PE 
and ceramic pipes are suitable for use in gravity sewers while pressure pipelines are 
normally constructed from PVC-U, PE or concrete pipes.   
The wastewater system has a design asset life of at least 100 years. 
 
 
5.2 Performance of the wastewater system (WWS) in the 
2010-2011 earthquakes 
In both earthquakes (4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011), the wastewater 
system was hit particularly hard resulting in numerous failures and limited or no-
service provided to large areas. As described in Section 6, typical damage to the 
network included loss of grade in gravity pipes, breakage of pipes/joints and 
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infiltration of liquefied silt into pipes (often accompanied by depression of 
carriageways, undulation of road surface and relative movement of manholes), and 
failure of joints and connections (particularly numerous failures of laterals). 
Detailed information on the damage to the wastewater system was still not available 
at the completion of this project predominantly for two reasons. A very large portion 
of the network was severely damaged and more importantly, the inspection of the 
damage and repairs of the wastewater network (unlike the water supply system) is 
much more difficult because the network is installed at larger depths (often exceeding 
2.5 m depth) and therefore there was a need for large number of repairs at depth, 
which in turn requires dewatering and trench support. It is estimated that a full 
recovery of the system will take about 2 to 3 years to complete, or even longer. 
The status of the damage inspections and data collection on the wastewater system 
can be summarised as follows: 
- CCTV inspections have been completed for parts of the damaged network 
after the Darfield earthquake. This data was still not readily available in 
analysis format at the completion of this project. 
- CCTV inspections have been also conducted for parts of the network after the 
22 February earthquake. This data was in early stages of compilation during 
this project.  
- Information on manholes including their movement relative to the adjacent 
road surface has been also compiled, but again was not available during the 
project. 
It is critically important to systematically collect, interpret and analyse these data in 
order to find out what worked well and what didn’t work in the existing wastewater 
system that was hit by the earthquakes, and also to identify key modes of 
failure/damage. In addition to the abovementioned data/information, the project team 
recommended and initiated: 
- Detailed case studies in selected areas in order to collect data and information 
on the performance of the network targeting specific sections/details of the 
system. 
- Development of systematic field inspection procedures/form for documenting 
relevant damage data during repairs over the period of reinstatement of the 
system. 
Service status maps for the wastewater network are shown in Figures 22 and 23 
(showing the status of the system on 16 March 2011 and 27 April 2011 respectively) 
to illustrate the extent of the damage and its distribution due to the 22 February 2011 
earthquake. Red lines indicate parts of the network without service, orange lines 
indicate limited service and green lines show full service of the network. The maps 
indicate the speed of recovery of the service into partial or full service though one 
should note that this includes also temporary solutions and restoration of service 
rather than full reinstatement of the network.  
Further studies and analyses of the wastewater network are required and strongly 
recommended (at all three levels of analyses and both in its simplified form and also 
by discriminating different failure types and damage contributions). 
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Figure 22. Wastewater network status as of 16 March 2011 illustrating distribution and severity of damage inflicted by the 22 February 2011 earthquake 
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Figure 23. Wastewater network status as of 27 April 2011 indicating the speed of reinstatement of services in conjunction with the status map shown in Figure 22 
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6 CCC ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
6.1 Material, Design and Construction Specifications 
The series of earthquakes experienced since 4 September 2010 has highlighted 
deficiencies within the specification of design and construction of the piped 
reticulation network for wastewater, storm water and potable water within 
Christchurch City.  
In order to inform and improve the design and construction of replacement 
infrastructure and to ensure future assets perform to acceptable levels of service, 
current Christchurch City Council material, design and construction specifications 
were reviewed.  
The standard CCC details were reviewed with respect to concept, geofabric selection 
and grading of the backfill and foundation material. The standard details were 
accepted as suitable for ongoing use in liquefiable parts of the city with only minor 
changes. 
Matters considered included a review of current best practice, an examination of 
alternative design and construction options, and possible opportunities to utilise these 
to increase the resilience of the built infrastructure. Overseas experience was also 
canvassed and the proposals from such experiences were examined in light of 
Christchurch conditions for their applicability. 
6.2 Seismic Effects 
The 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes affected the pipe networks in various ways 
and impacted their ability to provide adequate service to large areas of Christchurch. 
This was demonstrated in the following ways, amongst others: 
• Gravity reticulation experienced reduced capacities.   
• Potable water networks and pressure sewers experienced leakage and loss 
of pressure.  
• Wastewater reticulation had increased flows.  
• Pump stations were incapacitated. 
• All networks experienced damage leading to blockage or leakage at the 
interface with structures. 
A significant effect on the gravity pipe network has been the movement of pipe 
sections relative to each other, the surrounding ground and/or structures. This 
movement is evidenced by changes in grade, varying grades along a pipe length, or 
joint dislocation either within the pipe length, or at connections to structures. Effects 
included: 
• The loss of grade, which has reduced capacity particularly in gravity lines.  
• Inconsistencies in the invert level, which has encouraged deposition and 
reduced capacity. 
• Partial or complete blockage of main lines or laterals. 
• Joint damage or movement, allowing silt and groundwater infiltration or 
discharge of wastewater to groundwater. 
• Depressions in carriageways caused by infiltration of subgrade materials 
into the gravity system (or removal of liquefied subsoils through 
groundwater flow towards the surface). 
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Pressure networks have also experienced  
• Leakage and loss of pressure due to pipe and joint damage. 
• Blockage and damage to pumps and treatment facilities from ground 
movement including settlement, uplift and lateral displacements; and from 
mobilised silt in the wastewater stream. 
Some portions of Christchurch’s gravity reticulation network are installed at depths 
exceeding 2.5m. Damage to these lines has meant that there have been: 
• Large numbers of repairs at depth. 
• Delays when repairing, and high reinstatement costs, due to the required 
dewatering and trench support. 
6.3 Decisions 
The alternatives for repairing the pipe networks considered were assessed for their 
ability to counter seismic effects and their anticipated performance over the lifecycle 
of the infrastructure. The ability of alternative repairs to reduce the recovery time after 
a subsequent seismic event and the relative costs and benefits under these scenarios 
were considered, along with the applicability of these alternatives to the various 
component criticalities or liquefaction damage potential zones. These zones are 
shown on the Liquefaction Resistance Index (LRI) map produced through this project 
and discussed elsewhere.  
Where solutions are applicable to all zones within Christchurch City and to all 
infrastructure types, they have generally been published through amendments to 
Council Approved Material Specifications, the Infrastructure Design Standard (IDS, 
CCC, 2010a) or the Construction Standard Specifications (CSS, CCC, 2010b). These 
solutions are formatted as below and the location of this amendment is indicated to 
the right of the solution: 
 
? Recommended solutions are ticked and are applicable in all of 
Christchurch City. Where solutions are not used, record this non-
conformance in the design report. 
 Crossed items have been considered and dismissed at this time for the 
reasons stated.  
Location of 
solution in 
Council 
documentation  
 
The tabulated solutions will be applied as best practice for the relevant Liquefaction 
Resistance Index zones as shown. These will only be adopted after consideration of 
site information, network requirements and the condition of the infrastructure 
requiring repair. Some of these solutions may be prohibitively expensive if applied 
city-wide.  Criticality of the infrastructure is also a key consideration when assessing 
the more expensive options. 
 
Zones for which solution is acceptable, as 
defined on LRI map 
Suggested best practice solution, to be 
assessed against other options and 
considered in light of site investigations, 
network requirements and reticulation 
condition 
orange yellow green blue 
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6.4 Construction Alternatives 
Construction must comply with the CSS. The designer designs the project to the 
requirements of the IDS, referencing individual standard details from the CSS where 
appropriate.  Materials to be installed within Christchurch City must comply with the 
Council’s requirements, set out in the Approved Materials list and webpage and must 
be approved, as detailed in CSS: Part 1 clause 4.0. The designer selects from the 
approved materials, considering the requirements of the IDS for the application. 
1. Pipe haunching or surround and backfill details 
The Council has, and continues to use, imported gravel backfill for pipelines under 
roads to reduce the potential for trench settlement. This backfill also increases 
resistance to liquefaction damage by forming a zone of non-liquefiable soil above the 
pipe, providing a zone of much more permeable ground to relieve excess pore 
pressures immediately under and around the pipe and higher strength material along 
the trench.    
 
Alternative methods and materials for pipe haunching, surround and backfill 
investigated included: wrapping of the haunching material in geotextiles, providing 
reinforcing along the trench base through special foundations, different backfill or 
haunching materials and their compaction requirements, amending the specifications 
for geotextiles currently detailed, reinforcing the backfill immediately adjacent to 
manholes to prevent differential movement.  
 
Recommended solutions included: 
 
? Detail a “soft ground” or “raft” foundation wrapped in 
geotextile with strength class C, installed to TNZ F/2 to 
improve seismic strength 
CSS: Part 3 SD 344 
? Continue using M/4: AP40 or AP20 as pipe haunching 
or surround as they provide optimum seismic 
permeability and strength versus long term stability 
against fines migration. 
No amendment 
? Continue using M/4: AP40 or AP65 as trench backfill 
as they provide optimum seismic permeability and 
strength versus long term stability against fines 
migration. 
No amendment 
? Improve the pipe’s resilience by tightening bedding or 
haunching compaction requirements 
CSS: Part 3 clause 8.5.1 
CSS: Part 4 clause 
11.4.2 
 
Best practice solutions included: 
 orange yellow green blue 
Wrap pipe haunching or surround for flexible gravity pipes 
in geotextile, strength class C, installed to TNZ F/2 to 
improve seismic strength 
Yes Yes No No 
 
Alternatives looked at and subsequently discarded for the reasons shown are:  
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 Provide geogrid reinforcement to backfill immediately adjacent to manholes to encourage 
the manhole and the pipe to move as one – It is felt that the mesh won’t activate 
sufficiently early to prevent this movement.   
Research is continuing into the performance of various haunching options through 
site investigations and into the relative benefits of completely encasing the trench 
backfill in a geotextile. 
2. Polyethylene pipe construction 
The currently preferred material for pressure networks that require improved seismic 
resistance is polyethylene. The larger volume of polyethylene being installed 
highlighted some deficiencies in the CSS relating to installation, welding and testing. 
Amendments subsequently made to these documents and the related processes 
included: improving quality records, welder competence and welding methods, 
clarifying weld testing and pressure testing. 
 
Recommended solutions included: 
 
? Provide improved quality records through the 
Contract Quality Plan, including 
methodologies and weld records, to support 
weld and welder competence 
CSS: Part 3 clause 7.3, 7.4 
CSS: Part 4 clause 10.2, 10.3 
? Ensure polyethylene welders are competent, 
through requiring current industry 
qualifications and proof of experience 
relevant to pipe diameter being welded. 
Provide process for assessment of welder 
competence and consequences of weld failure 
CSS: Part 3 clause 7.3, 7.4 
CSS: Part 4 clause 10.2, 10.3 
? Improve weld construction through 
amendments to construction specifications 
including equipment and processes 
CSS: Part 3 clause 7.3, 7.4, 
14.2.6 
CSS: Part 4 clause 10.2, 10.3 
? Provide commentaries and graphical plots of 
electrofusion peel decohesion test results to 
confirm weld competence and allow tracking 
of material or welder related performance 
issues  
CSS: Part 3 clause 14.4 
CSS: Part 4 clause 17.2 
? Update polyethylene pressure test 
requirements to ensure testing is relevant to 
pipe size and use and results are clear 
CSS: Part 3 clause 14.3 
CSS: Part 4 clause 17.3 
? Update ovality test requirements to current 
best practice 
CSS: Part 3 clause 14.4.6 
 
3. Manhole construction  
The performance of manholes under seismic loading has not been consistent. 
Research is continuing into how manholes have performed through the events 
experienced in the various liquefaction areas, relative to the adjacent ground.  
 
Alternatives looked at and subsequently discarded for the reasons shown are:  
 Provide drainage into and around manholes to decrease seismically generated porewater 
pressures – evidence from the past events does not consistently illustrate that manholes 
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float, rather than the land settling relative to them in some situations. There are potential 
problems with this drainage facility diverting groundwater flows into the wastewater 
network. This may increase overall flow rates and compromise existing groundwater flow 
patterns.  
 Provide additional weight to manholes to prevent flotation – evidence is not consistent 
that manholes always float.  
 
4. Material Selection 
Material alternatives and changes to current specifications investigated included: 
increasing the pipe stiffness, specifying ductile materials, improving the material 
specification for connections between pipes and for fittings.  
 
Recommended solutions included: 
? For gravity applications, use PVC-U pipe, SN16 
for 100 and 150 diameter, SN8 for 225 and above, 
to improve the pipe’s resistance to becoming oval 
or buckling under seismic loading 
Website Approved Materials 
List V 11 
? For wastewater pressure applications, use 
polyethylene pipe as it has experienced no known 
failures under seismic loading 
IDS clause 6.8 
? Increase the minimum PN for polyethylene pipe in 
wastewater pressure applications to PN10 to 
improve resistance to seismic loading  
Website Approved Materials 
List V 11 
 
Best practice solutions included: 
 red orange green blue 
Use polyethylene pipe for potable water applications as the 
pipe body has experienced no known failures under seismic 
loading  
Yes Yes No No 
 
Site research and testing is continuing into actual material and connection or fitting 
performance under seismic loading and into the performance of reinforced concrete 
pipes. 
5. Joint details  
Investigated joint alternatives included: wrapping pipe joints in geotextiles, installing 
PVC-U long socket connectors at manholes, increasing the socket length on PVC-U 
pipes. 
 
Recommended solutions included: 
? Wrap PVC-U gravity pipe joints, including on 
laterals, in geotextile with strength class C to 
prevent ingress of silt where joints open up under 
seismic loading 
IDS clause 5.13.3 and 6.12  
CSS: Part 3 clause 8.5.6 
? Install long socket connectors to manholes on 
PVC-U gravity reticulation to increase the 
potential to accommodate longitudinal joint 
IDS clause 5.10.6 and 6.6.3 
CSS: Part 3 clause 8.10.5  
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movement 
? Improve socket lengths and so joint movement 
capacity on PVC-U pipes by specifying minimum 
socket lengths and marking two witness marks 
(one as a reference mark) through CCC PVC-U 
material approval 
CCC Webpage - Approved 
materials, Witness mark 
memo 
 
Research is continuing into actual material performance, how their connections 
reacted under seismic loading, and the performance of polyethylene mechanical 
couplers under simulated seismic loading.  
6.5 Design Alternatives 
The process of design is iterative in that various options are considered, assessed 
against each other and the hazards or risks that the infrastructure is expected to 
experience, and finally the optimum solution presented for construction. The series of 
earthquakes have highlighted the need to consider a range of effects, many of which 
cannot be precisely defined, against which the options are evaluated. Because of this 
and the ongoing work to define the expected performance of the infrastructure, some 
of the solutions are current ‘best practice’ rather that recommendations. 
Designs must comply with the stated requirements of the IDS. Where the design 
varies from these requirements, a non-conformance report is generated and presented 
to council as a record of the above decision making process. 
 
6. Providing for future events 
Historically there has been little geotechnical investigation for pipeline construction, 
other than some bores at manhole locations to the manhole depth.  
Improved resilience can be provided through increasing the capability of the network 
to withstand seismic events by allowing for future settlement, by providing a system 
that will not be as affected by liquefaction or land movement e.g. pressure systems, by 
adding redundancy into the network, by using more robust materials and by designing 
to reduce the recovery time involved in repairs or replacement. 
 
Best practice solutions include the following: 
 orange yellow green blue 
Allow in designing gravity line grades for
liquefaction settlement as determined by the LRI 
zone and associated settlements table 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Carry out detailed geotechnical investigations of 
sites to determine the liquefaction potential and
therefore likely settlement or lateral spread and
subsequent movement that major or critical 
infrastructure must resist.  
Yes Yes No No 
Apply the guidelines from NTC 33 clauses 32-37, 
detailing what the geotechnical investigation for 
pump station sites should address. 
Yes Yes No No 
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Consider alternative depths or wastewater
reticulation systems instead of large scale gravity 
networks serviced by substantial lift pump stations 
Yes Yes No No 
 
7. Differential movement risk areas 
Network analysis suggests that the water reticulation experienced greater damage 
rates at the hill/plain interface by comparison to similar reticulation in other areas. 
This area may require special consideration to ensure there is sufficient ductility in 
the reticulation and the reticulation performance is still being analysed. 
8. Lateral spread risk areas 
Liquefaction encourages lateral spread in those areas where the land is sloping or is 
not confined e.g. adjacent to rivers and slopes.  
Measures to counter damage to reticulation in these areas include: 
 
? Design for ease of repair e.g. fittings between 
the structure and the pipe should be placed 
above-ground for easy access. 
 
? Improve pipe flexibility through using 
polyethylene in lateral spread areas and through 
designing adequate compensatory flexibility 
into the connections to structures etc 
 
 
9. Sewer depths and grades 
There are a number of ways to reduce the depth of gravity sewers in selected areas 
and as a larger scale solution. These include: detailing collector sewers, laying gravity 
lines to the flattest functioning grade, restricting sewer depths and lateral connection 
depths. 
 
Recommended solutions included: 
 
? Install collector sewers over existing deep (over 
2.5m) sewers, where depth permits. This is to 
prevent future repairs on laterals and junctions 
at depth 
IDS clause 6.5.8 
CSS: Part 3 clause 
8.10.6 
? Apply depth restriction of 3.5m to gravity 
sewers to prevent possibility of repairs at depth 
IDS clause 6.5.6 
? Apply depth restriction of 2.5m for the 
connection of laterals to gravity sewers to 
prevent possibility of repairs at depth 
IDS clause 6.10.1 
 
Research is continuing into the minimum grades at which sewers can be laid in 
Christchurch City. Allowances for liquefaction settlement can then be more clearly 
defined. 
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10. Material selection 
Seismic events load pipes in all directions. Ductility within and between the pipe 
segments and robust connections between pipes and fittings or structures are 
fundamental to maintaining a functioning network after an earthquake event.  
Material choices to counter this include: 
 
? Avoid using brittle pipe materials wherever 
possible 
No amendment 
? Detail long socket connectors to manholes on 
PVC-U gravity reticulation to provide increased 
longitudinal joint movement 
IDS clause 5.10.6 and 
6.6.3  
 
11. Foundation treatments 
Liquefaction substantially reduces the strength of the pipe foundation materials.  
Foundation treatments designed to counter this include: 
 
? Use “soft ground” or “raft” foundation options for 
pipes laid in areas where foundation bearing 
pressures are less than 50kPa 
CSS : Part 3 SD 344/3 
 
Research is continuing into the performance of various haunching options through 
site investigations and into the relative benefits of completely encasing the trench 
backfill in a geotextile. 
 
 
12. Redundant infrastructure 
Methods of treating the large volume of damaged infrastructure potentially remaining 
in the ground require consideration due to the cost of this treatment as a component of 
the rebuild works.  
Recommended solutions include the following: 
 
? Removal is preferred because these pipes form voids 
which can undermine the foundations of pavements 
and adjacent services and can disrupt groundwater 
flows.  
Not yet 
incorporated into 
Council 
documentation 
? Treatment is dependent on the proximity to all 
services, the pipe’s position in the road cross-section 
and the size of the pipe. If grouting, ensure it is 
continuous along the pipe length. Low strength 
concrete (3MPa) is preferred to prevent future issues 
where the pipe may require removal.  
Not yet 
incorporated into 
Council 
documentation 
? Obsolete AC pipes should preferably be left in the 
ground due to contamination problems. 
Not yet 
incorporated into 
Council 
documentation 
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7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 
 
Performance-based design of lifelines requires, as a starting point, to set the 
performance objectives of the system. Since such objectives were loosely defined 
under the “provision of service”, a discussion was initiated within the Council to 
address the following questions: “what are according to the Council, acceptable levels 
of service for the water and wastewater systems, for major events such as these 
earthquakes?”; “what is the acceptable percentage of the population to be without 
service, and for what period of time?”. The ultimate goal was for the CCC to establish 
specific performance objectives for the Water Supply and Wastewater Systems which 
will provide appropriate design objectives and performance that is balanced between 
effort and cost (capital and operational), and aims at realistic (achievable) and 
acceptable performance levels. The initial document stimulating this discussion is 
given in Appendix E and the tables below summarize the provisional performance 
objectives (currently under discussion) derived independently by the CCC asset 
management team based on their technical and operational scrutiny of the 
performance of the systems in the 2010-2011 earthquakes and community reaction. 
 
 
Domestic Service - Disaster Recovery- Design Level of Service 
 Water Supply Waste Water 
48 (72)hours 90% of Premises 85% of Premises 
48 (72)  hours 95% Critical facilities 95% Critical Facilities 
4 (7) days 95%  of premises n/a 
7 (14) days 99.5% of premises 90% of Premises 
1 (2) month n/a 99.5% of Premises 
 
 
Quality -Disaster Recovery -Design Levels of Service 
 Water Supply Waste Water 
2 weeks n/a 80% of effluent reaches treatment plants 
1 month 90% of city receives water 
conforming to NZDWS 
90% 
3  (6)months n/a 99% 
3 months n/a Treatment (or lack of) not causing 
significant adverse environmental 
impacts 
6 months n/a Full Consent Compliance 
 
 
Business Continuity -Disaster Recovery -Design Level of Service 
 Water Supply Waste Water 
1 month 95% of Industry/ commercial activity 
able to resume normal business 
90% of Industry/ commercial activity 
able to resume normal business 
3 months  95% 
6 (12) months  99% 
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8 LIQUEFACTION RESISTANCE MAP 
 
8.1 LRI Concept 
In the simplified procedure for liquefaction evaluation (Youd et al., 2001) a factor of 
safety against triggering of liquefaction (in a free field level ground deposit), FS, is 
calculated as: 
 
MSF
CSR
CRRFS 5.7=       (1) 
 
where CRR7.5 is the Cyclic Resistance Ratio or liquefaction resistance while the 
seismic load (demand) is defined by the Cyclic Stress Ratio (CSR) and Magnitude 
Scaling Factor (MSF). Here CSR accounts for the amplitude of the seismic load (using 
the peak ground acceleration as a measure for the amplitude) while MSF accounts for 
the duration of shaking (or number of significant load cycles) using the earthquake 
magnitude as a proxy for the shaking duration. If FS ≤ 1.0, then the available 
liquefaction resistance is smaller than (equal to) the seismic load (demand) and hence 
liquefaction will be triggered (will occur) for the considered ground motion 
(earthquake). The simplified method is used as a predictive tool to evaluate the 
liquefaction potential at a given site for an assumed ground motion (PGA, Mw) and 
estimated liquefaction resistance CRR7.5 using empirical relationships based on 
penetration resistance or shear wave velocity. 
 
Using this approach, the inverse problem could be solved to back-calculate the 
liquefaction resistance CRR7.5 based on records of ground motions and observed 
liquefaction manifestation due to an earthquake. In the inverse problem, CSR and 
MSF are calculated using actual records of peak ground accelerations (PGA) and the 
earthquake magnitude (Mw) respectively, while FS is estimated from the observed 
severity of liquefaction manifestation, and eventually the liquefaction resistance is 
back-calculated as: 
 
FSCSR
MSF
FSCSRCRR ⋅=⋅= 5.75.7       (2) 
 
Here CSR7.5 is a function of PGA and Mw whereas FS is a function of the severity of 
liquefaction manifestation. This approach was adopted to calculate a so-called 
Liquefaction Resistance Index (LRI) map and develop liquefaction zoning for 
Christchurch based on LRI, as described below. 
 
There are a couple of advantages of this approach. First, it allows us to quantify actual 
earthquake observations and summarize them in the form of a liquefaction zoning 
(hazard) map. Second, using this approach we could quickly develop preliminary 
liquefaction zoning for the needs of CCC and their immediate decision making before 
a more robust zoning/analyses based on high-quality geotechnical data could be 
completed. A brief summary of the development of the Liquefaction Resistance Map 
is presented below whereas details are given in the Appendices C and D. 
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8.2 CSR7.5(wt) values from the Darfield and Christchurch 
earthquakes 
As shown in the appendix, CSR7.5 is a function of the peak ground acceleration, 
considered depth in the deposit and water table depth, i.e. CSR7.5 = f[PGA, z, wt(z)]. 
When the water table is at shallow depths, then the effects of z and wt(z) diminish and 
the cyclic stress ratio effectively reduces to a function of PGA alone, i.e. CSR7.5(wt) = 
f[PGA]. Thus, using the geometric mean peak ground accelerations recorded at the 
strong motion stations within and in the vicinity of Christchurch during the Darfield 
and Christchurch earthquakes, CSR7.5(wt) were computed at the strong motion stations 
and then were interpolated across Christchurch using ordinary krigging interpolation, 
as shown in Figure 24. 
As described in Section 4, for the Christchurch potable water system the pressurised 
pipe network is typically at shallow depths of about 0.8 m, while the wastewater pipes 
are predominantly at depths from 2.0-3.5 m. In addition, for most of the suburbs that 
experienced liquefaction in Christchurch, the water table was high, at about 1 m to 1.5 
m from the ground surface. For these reasons, the liquefaction zoning for pipe 
networks was focused on the shallow depths of the deposits corresponding from the 
depth of the water table to 2 metres below the water table. However, it should be 
noted that the results would not change significantly (in relative terms) if slightly 
larger depths are considered (say 4 to 5 m below the water table). 
 
 
 
Figure 24. CSR7.5(wt) values produced in Christchurch by the 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011 earthquakes (ordinary krigging interpolation with a spherical 
variogram model; note that the CSR-values at the north boundary and the area at 
the HVSC station were constrained to eliminate spurious effects of either lack of 
data or extremely high accelerations due to localized effects  
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8.3 Estimated FS values based on liquefaction observations 
from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes 
A key issue in the calculation of LRI maps is the assumption/evaluation of the factor 
of safety FS . We have to assume the factor of safety for both areas that did, and areas 
that did not liquefy during the earthquakes. Details about the reasoning behind the 
selection of particular FS  values are given in Appendix C whereas here a brief 
summary of the results is presented. 
For the liquefied areas, the factor of safety was defined based on the severity of 
manifested liquefaction in the field, as summarized in Table 4. Since triggering of 
liquefaction yields by definition FS = 1.0, traces of liquefaction, low to moderate 
liquefaction and moderate to severe liquefaction were given FS values of 0.9, 0.75 
and 0.50 respectively. In other words, FS decreases with increased severity of 
liquefaction manifestation.  An FS of 0.5 indicates that the available cyclic strength of 
the soil was half of the seismic load induced by the earthquake. For cases of extreme 
or very severe effects of liquefaction, an FS value of 0.25 was adopted. 
In the non-liquefied areas, it was conservatively adopted that in areas where the water 
table was at 1m or 2m depth, that FS  was slightly above the threshold triggering 
value or 1.1 and 1.25, respectively. Then FS  was increased with the water table depth 
since it is well known that a thick crust decreases the likelihood of occurrence and 
surface manifestation of liquefaction. Thus, FS  = 1.5, 1.75 and 2.0 was adopted for 
areas with depth to water table of 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0m. The adopted FS  values across 
different severity of liquefaction and water table depths are summarized in Figure 25. 
This approach was applied to establish an LRI map for Christchurch using the 
liquefaction map shown in Figure 6 and CSR7.5(wt) distribution (Figure 24) calculated 
based on the magnitude and recorded PGAs for the Darfield and Christchurch 
earthquakes. Figure 26 shows the FS values in different areas of Christchurch using 
liquefaction severity and depth of water table as quantifiers for the factor of safety. 
Figure 27 shows nominal FS  values based on the water table depth in Christchurch. 
Note that in Figure 26 a large area shown in grey was not covered in the liquefaction 
inspections since there was no accurate information whether liquefaction occurred or 
not (or what was its severity of liquefaction) in this area. By multiplying the FS  
values shown in Figure 26 with the CSR7.5(wt) of Figure 24 the LRI value was 
calculated and summarized in Figure 28 in the form of a Liquefaction Resistance 
Index map of Christchurch. Here orange, yellow, green and blue indicate Zones 1, 2, 
3 and 4, with Zone 1 being the reference zone. The red zone covers part of the 
abandoned areas and is below the established threshold LRI value of 0.065. Note that 
the zone numbers also indicate the relative liquefaction resistance. Thus, for example, 
Zone 3 has three times the liquefaction strength of the lower bound value of Zone 1. 
To further facilitate the use of the LRI map in preliminary design evaluations, Table 5 
summarizes the typical range of settlements associated with each zone. These are 
based on expert judgement and should be taken only as preliminary estimates with 
further updates to follow based on more robust interpretation and analysis. 
For the grey zone we recommend to use a comparative analysis of the performance of 
the network for provisional classification. For example, if the wastewater system 
performance in a grey zone was similar to the performance of a green zone, then the 
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zone could be provisionally classified as ‘green’ or Zone 3. One should be rigorous 
when comparing different parts of the network (and apply this to network segments 
with similar design/material characteristics) and also reasonably conservative when 
adopting this approach of provisional zoning of the uninspected grey areas. 
 
Table 4. Adopted correlation between FS  and liquefaction severity 
Average Factor 
of Safety, FS  
Liquefaction 
Severity  
Typical Manifestation and Damage to Structures Estimated 
Ground 
Settlement 
0.90 Traces of 
liquefaction 
Some evidence of liquefaction, but limited both in extent 
and impacts, and judged non-damaging for structures 
< 50 mm 
0.75 Low to 
moderate 
Clear evidence of liquefaction, with scattered sand boils 
(sand ejecta) and ground distortion; low damage to 
residential buildings and buried pipe networks. 
50 – 200 mm 
0.50 Moderate to 
severe 
Very large, continuous and thick sand ejecta, severe 
ground distortion (undulations, fissures) and substantial 
total and differential settlements; moderate to severe 
damage to residential buildings and buried pipe networks. 
 200 – 400 mm 
0.25 Very severe 
(extreme) 
Extreme manifestation of liquefaction with excessive 
ground distortion including very large total and 
differential settlements, vertical offsets and ground 
fissures, often accompanied with severe effects of lateral 
spreading; excessive (most often beyond repair) damage 
to residential buildings and buried pipe networks. 
> 400 mm 
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Figure 25.  Adopted factors of safety (against liquefaction) in areas of manifested liquefaction 
(FS < 1.0) and areas of no liquefaction (FS > 1.0) with different water table depth
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Figure 26.  Factors of safety (against liquefaction) map back-calculated based on liquefaction observations from the 2010-2011 earthquakes and water table depth information. 
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Figure 27.  Water table depth contours modified from Brown and Weeber (1992), converted to a 50 m resolution raster with Factors of safety allocated to areas that did not 
liquefy during the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes 
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Figure 28.  Liquefaction Resistance Index (Zoning) of Christchurch at water table depth based on liquefaction observations from the 2010-2011 earthquakes and water table 
depth information 
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Table 5.  LRI Zones and associated ground deformation (settlements, lateral displacements and 
strains) 
Zone Equivalent CRR 
(at water table) 
Representative 
LRI 
(at water table) 
Ground 
settlement 
(mm) 
Lateral 
displacement 
(relative; 
transient) 
(mm) 
Assumed 
ground strains 
and  
thickness of 
liquefied layer 
0 < 0.065 - > 500 > 400 εv > 5%, γ > 4%, 
HL=5-10m 
1 0.065  -0.11 0.065 250 – 500 200 - 400 εv = 5%, γ = 4%, 
HL=5-10m 
2 0.11 – 0.16 0.13 50 - 250 40 - 200 εv = 3%, γ = 2%, 
HL=4-8m 
3 0.16 – 0.23 0.195 20 - 50 20 - 40 εv = 1%, γ = 1%, 
HL=2-4m 
4 > 0.23 0.26 < 20 < 20 γ < 0.5%, HL=0m 
- The ground displacement values exclude effects of lateral spreading 
- Design should accommodate the higher value of displacement/deformation 
- εv = volumetric strain, γ = shear strain 
- The table and LRI map are for preliminary use and restricted to the water / wastewater systems of 
Christchurch 
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9 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
9.1 American Lifeline Alliance (ALA) Guidelines (Documents) 
A set of guidelines for Water Systems and Wastewater Systems prepared by the 
American Lifeline Alliance (ALA) was reviewed during this project including advice 
and consultation with USA authorities and experts on lifelines. While further review 
and scrutiny of these guidelines is in progress, here we provide some excerpts from 
the ALA Wastewater Systems: Guideline (ALA, 2004). 
 
ALA Wastewater Guideline Objective 
The guideline provides minimum recommended requirements for evaluating 
wastewater systems to allow defensible answers to questions regarding system 
performance in natural hazards and human threat events. 
 
Risk Based Assessment 
The performance assessment approach presented in the guideline is, in general terms, 
developed to estimate the relative risk associated with each wastewater system 
component for each natural hazard or human treat. 
The period on which to base the probability of exceedance for the hazard is often 
considered 50 years. Useful life of various components of lifeline systems: 
- 50-year life: an average estimate of the useful life of various components 
- 20-year life: mechanical components 
- 50-year life: building components 
- 100-year life: buried pipelines 
 
Levels of Performance Assessment 
Three levels of assessment are advocated: 
(1) Simplified 
(2) Intermediate  
(3) Advanced  
Simplified assessment is first carried out, to determine if Intermediate or Advanced 
Assessment is required. Several motivating factors for assessment have been 
identified including: “direct loss – repair costs of facilities damaged in hazard 
events”, public health and safety, level of service (outage time), societal cost/business 
interruption and loss of public confidence. These are all relevant for the Christchurch 
wastewater system. 
 
Performance Assessment Process 
Step 1: Define the project objective and select the required level of assessment 
Step 2: Select performance metrics 
Step 3: Define the performance objectives 
Step 4: Define the WS to be assessed 
Step 5: Define relevant natural hazards and human threats 
Step 6: Assess the vulnerability of system components 
Step 7: Assess system performance under conditions of natural hazards 
Step 8: Assess whether the performance objectives are met. 
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Overview of mitigation 
The assessment is an iterative process in which the following are used as mitigation 
factors: 
(1) Modification of the emergency response, 
(2) Modification of component vulnerability, and 
(3) Modification of target performance objective 
 
 
Performance metrics 
The originating purpose of providing sanitary sewers was to protect public health by 
transporting raw sewage away from population. The metric can be posed in terms of 
the success of achieving this objective. 
Potential metrics recommended are: 
1) public health/backup of raw sewage 
2) discharge of raw/inadequately treated sewage (for some events that occur 
every 100 to 500 years, it is assumed that discharge of raw/inadequately 
treated sewage will occur; the intent of the metric is to quantify that discharge 
and the probability of its occurrence; provide different criteria as a function of 
the receiving water, e.g. stream, river, lake ocean). 
3) direct damage/financial impact (Historically, property losses are an order of 
magnitude smaller than societal economic losses, and usually do not control; 
however, in some situations, direct damage to WS should be taken into 
account; significant earthquake damage is given as an example; potential 
secondary damage due to loss of wastewater service to commercial and 
industrial facilities). 
4) security system performance 
 
Performance objectives 
Suggested starting points (performance objectives) are listed in the table below. 
Interestingly enough, the CCC assets management team arrived independently at 
similar performance objectives based on their analysis of the performance of the 
wastewater system in the 2010-2011 earthquakes including perceptions and reactions 
of the public and wastewater system managers. 
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Other suggestions/recommendations from the ALA guidelines 
• Do not collect data for the sake of collecting data, but gather it with a specific 
need in mind. 
• The performance assessment can focus on system operations or on 
infrastructure vulnerability / damage exposure (probable maximum losses). 
• For single site facilities, hazard probabilities and associated intensities can be 
used directly (such as is done for building codes). 
• However, for distributed lifeline systems, scenario events, (with a determined 
probability) must be used, to reflect the variation in hazard intensity across 
system in any given event. 
• Dependent (earthquake shaking and liquefaction, lateral spreading) hazards. 
The probability of liquefaction in an earthquake is determined from the 
independent ground motion and the liquefaction susceptibility relationship. 
Hazard scenarios include both independent and dependent hazards. 
• Advanced Hazard Assessment: An assessment of this level would probably 
never be warranted for a wastewater utility. 
• Use caution when applying “water” experience database to wastewater 
systems due to inherent differences between the two systems.  
      Gravity sewers differ from water pipelines as follows: 
- They are generally buried deeper 
- The pipe body/materials and joints are typically weaker as they are not 
designed for pressure 
- They are more buoyant because they are only partially filled with sewage 
- Sewer pipelines can generally withstand more damage and remain 
functional, relative to pressurized water pipelines.  
 
• Pipeline damage relationships are usually developed in the form of failures per 
unit length. 
• Failure of sewers can result in development of large sinkholes that result in 
damage to the utilities above. 
• Failure to provide adequate treatment of wastewater before it is discharged 
will “contaminate” the receiving water. 
• A Correlation Factor (dimensionless term) is added to the risk equation in the 
Simplified Assessment to take into account the number of system components 
a single hazard event will impact: 
 
Relative Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability x Consequence x Correlation Factor 
 
• Any assessment of WS performance only represents a snapshot at a particular 
point in time. 
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9.2 The 1995 Kobe (Hyogoken Nambu) Earthquake 
Experience 
 
Background 
At 5:46 AM on Tuesday January 17 1995, a powerful earthquake struck the Hanshin 
and Awaji area that includes Kobe city west of Osaka. Its epicentre was the northern 
end of Awajishima (or Awaji island) with magnitude M7.2 on the Richter scale (and 
moment magnitude, MW=6.9). More than 5,500 people died and about 35,000 were 
injured. Some 320,000 survivors were left homeless and were forced to take shelter in 
school gymnasiums and other public facilities. The earthquake damaged many 
segments of the infrastructure, including water supply and wastewater facilities, 
mainly induced by the earthquake forces and ground displacements, notably due to 
widespread liquefaction of the ground. 
 
Damage to water works was observed in over 68 municipal water utilities and 3 bulk 
water supply authorities, which cover 9 prefectures. The number of houses which 
suffered from water supply cutoff reached 1,200,000 immediately after the earthquake. 
Twenty water purification plants were heavily damaged in Kobe, Nishinomiya and 
Ashiya cities. Pumps and mechanical or electric installations placed in galleries were 
submerged and damaged. The most damaged parts of the water supply system were 
the pipelines where a great deal of leakage occurred in transmission lines and 
distribution networks. Leakage occurred at pipe breaks, joints or couplings, valves, air 
valves, fire hydrants and so on. Breakage such as pull-out or crushing at pipe joints 
was dominant, reaching nearly 50% of the total breakage in the distribution network. 
Forty three wastewater treatment plants out of 102 which were operating in Hyogo, 
Osaka and Kyoto prefectures were damaged. In eight of the plants, secondary 
treatment function was lost. The Higashinada Wastewater Treatment Plant in Kobe 
City was severely damaged due to liquefaction and lateral ground deformation. Sewer 
pipes were also damaged, with a total length of about 162 km or 1866 sites. Trunk 
sewers were only slightly damaged though some of them were broken resulting in 
temporary suspension of water transmission. Damage was found mainly at the 
connections of manholes and pipes, and the connections of lateral sewers and public 
inlets. Moreover, some damage in outlet bulkheads was also reported. 
 
More detailed description of the degree of damage is provided in the Appendix.  
 
Emergency Actions 
In order to supply necessary drinking water to residents, many supply utilities and 
personnel were sent from all over Japan. An emergency water supply system was 
organized, with 1,027 tank trucks from 44 prefectures and several water tank boats 
were provided by the central government. Emergency restoration was executed on the 
water supply system through repair of the distribution network and installation of 
temporary water taps for damaged houses. 
 
Long-term Restoration Methods 
Following the reconnaissance works, the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) put 
out a proposal for the earthquake resistant design of civil engineering structures. The 
proposal mentioned that trunk lines for lifeline systems (such as water, sewerage, 
electricity, gas, and telecommunications) must be designed to maintain functionality 
after a Level II earthquake (equivalent to a ULS event in NZ), taking into account the 
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topography, ground conditions, and the city layout in the vicinity. If this is difficult 
for economic reasons or because of ground conditions, continued functionality (or 
rapid restoration) after a disaster should be ensured by selecting the most appropriate 
route, adopting a multi-route system, using a block system, or implementing some 
alternative measures.  
 
Repair of water supply pipes 
The Kobe Municipal Waterworks Bureau adopted the following aseismic design 
guidelines for future earthquakes: (1) to localize earthquake damage as much as 
possible; (2) to easily repair damage; and (3) to provide measures to prevent 
secondary disasters following the earthquake. 
Based on the experience from this earthquake, the use of earthquake-resistant pipe 
with excellent “earthquake-proofing” capability has been adopted (see Appendix for 
some examples). In addition to replacing old pipes, existing pipes were also made 
“earthquake-proof”. By considering the emergency water supply activity following 
the earthquake, the “earthquake-proof” pipes were laid out at spacing of 500 m along 
the route toward the designated disaster prevention centres.  
 
In addition to two water supply tunnels that pass through Rokko Mountain, large-
capacity transmission mains that pass through deep underground in urban areas were 
developed. The idea is that the seismic risk can be distributed by dividing the water 
supply route into the urban area and through Rokko Mountain. Moreover, because of 
their high earthquake resistance and large capacity for storing water, emergency water 
supply during and at the early stage of a disaster would not be a problem. 
 
Repair of Sewage Facilities 
Following the earthquake, "Sewer Ordinance Amendment” is now required for the 
earthquake resistant design of sewerage pipeline facilities. The Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) notified all sewerage companies to implement 
the "Earthquake Emergency Sewer Improvement Project." In this project, for example, 
pipelines connecting the treatment plant to the refuge shelters and disaster prevention 
centres, as well as pipelines buried under emergency tracks and roads, should be 
earthquake-resistant within five years after implementation of the plan. The design 
concepts are described in the "Guide to Aseismic Emergency Sewer Improvement 
Plan (Draft)" published by MLIT, as well as in "Guidelines and Description for 
Aseismic Measures in Sewerage Facilities" and "Earthquake-resistant Sewer Manual" 
published by the Japan Sewage Works Association.  
 
As a result of the damage observed during the Kobe earthquake, the Kobe City 
Construction Bureau recommended a set of design standards for sewer facilities. 
These standards were further refined, incorporating lessons learned from subsequent 
major earthquake events that occurred in other parts of the country. The current 
design standards, which were enforced in the city from 1 June 2011, are illustrated in 
the Kobe City website (http://www.city.kobe.lg.jp/life/town/ 
waterworks/sewage/gesuidosekkeihyojunzu.html).  
 
One of the problems seen during the Kobe earthquake was the buoyant rise of 
manholes, resulting in damage to sewer pipes. In order to prevent manholes from 
rising as a result of the liquefaction of foundation ground as well as damage to 
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connecting pipes, several methods have been developed, and some of these are shown 
in the Appendix. These methods are explained briefly below. 
(1) Earth drain method: Artificial drain consisting of high permeability soil is 
placed around the manhole using a specialized machine. 
(2) Anchor wing method: The manhole is anchored to the bottom unliquefied layer 
by a frame structure (called wing). 
(3) LAM Method: The manhole is anchored to the bottom unliquefied layer by a 
single rod attached to the bottom of the structure. 
(4) Safe Manhole Method: Tubes are installed within the manhole and near the joint 
to drain excess pore water pressure generated during liquefaction. 
(5) Anti-float method: A heavy base plate is placed at the bottom of the manhole to 
prevent uplift.  
(6) Aseismic method for existing manholes: A special cutting machine is used to 
cut the edge of the manhole and the existing pipe by cutting the manhole wall 
and flexible joint and elastic sealant are installed at the connection. 
(7) Aseismic improvement method for existing pipe: Using a chainsaw-type cutting 
machine, the pipe joint is cut and a light fitting consisting of rubber and the 
steel-made is placed to make the joint flexible. 
(8) Prevention of uplift using manhole flange: A convex-shape material is placed on 
the outer part of the manhole, and a weight is placed to increase resistance 
against uplift. 
(9) Float-less method (non-excavation type): Excess pore water pressure generated 
by earthquake is drained out. 
(10) Magma lock method: the impact of earthquake-induced displacement is 
decreased using a special flexible joint and magma lock. 
(11) Hat ring method: A cylindrical ring block is placed on existing manhole to 
prevent uplift. 
(12) Wide safety pipe method: Tubes installed inside the manhole dissipates the 
excess pore water pressure. Moreover, underground water is not taken by 
installing a reverse-action valve in the manhole pipe. 
(13) “Mr. Aseismic” (Taishin-ippatsu kun) method: New pipes are installed to add 
seismic capacity to old structures with worn-out pipes and manholes. 
 
 
9.3 The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Experience 
In the 11 March 2011 earthquake (Great East Japan Earthquake; magnitude 9.0) 
extensive liquefaction was induced in suburbs of Tokyo (Urayasu) and residential 
areas immediately north-east of the capital (Itako and Kamisu). The impacts on 
residential areas and lifelines were in many ways similar to those in Christchurch 
(Towhata, 2011). In the further studies, it is intended to compile a brief summary and 
draw some conclusions based on these experiences as well. 
 
 
 
 62
10 CALCULATION OF LIQUEFACTION-INDUCED 
UPLIFT OF MANHOLES 
 
10.1 Overview 
The occurrence of liquefaction is often associated with significant ground 
deformations and settlements.  However, where buoyant structures exist, the 
occurrence of liquefaction can lead to the uplift of such structures.  Observations of 
unacceptably large uplifts to pipe networks and manholes have been observed in past 
earthquakes (e.g. Koseki et al (1997), and references therein) and hence require 
appropriate design consideration. 
 
The primary reason for liquefaction-induced uplift of structures is the result of the 
increased uplift forces at the base of structures due to upward flow of excess pore-
water pressures, as well as the loss of resistive friction forces along the embedded 
sides of structures due to the reduction in soil effective stress.   
 
While uplift of structures has been well documented in past earthquakes, the 
complexity of the liquefaction phenomena and post-liquefaction deformations and 
pore-water flow mean simplified calculations for initial assessment of uplift hazard 
are still relatively imprecise.  A potentially more precise estimation of uplift hazard 
can be obtained via effective stress analyses, but often such complex analyses are not 
viable for various reasons (personnel experience and time demands).   
 
10.2 Factor of safety against uplift 
The assessment of uplift hazard should be conducted within the ‘impact on structures’ 
step of a liquefaction hazard assessment.  Specifically, before conducting an uplift 
hazard assessment one must first have assessed the potential for liquefaction to occur 
for the considered scenario.   
 
The most common method for the simplified estimation of liquefaction induced uplift 
of structures is the factor of safety approach.  The factor of safety against uplift can be 
represented as: 
 
 
 
where  is the weight of the structure (and possibly overlying soil);  is the resisting 
side friction along the embedded surface of the structure (typically assumed to be zero 
if the surrounding soils are expected to liquefy);  is the (static) buoyancy force due 
to hydrostatic pressure;  is the (dynamic) uplift force due to excess pore pressures 
and  is the seepage force which can be calculated as per Figure 29: 
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Figure 29: Calculation of seepage force, F (Koseki et al. 1997). 
 
For the specific geometry of manholes in particular it is possible to semi-automate the 
calculation of the uplift factor of safety.  The calculation requires several physical and 
geometrical parameters, as outlined in Figure 30.   
 
The key geometrical parameters are: 
• The manhole dimensions: diameter, ; and depth, . 
• The manhole weight,  
• The density of the soil above and below the WT,  and , respectively 
• The depth of the WT, , and depth from base of the manhole to non-
liquefiable layer, . 
 
Figure 30: Notation used for manhole uplift calculations. 
 
Note that no parameters for the uplift account for the soil strength etc. and hence as 
previously noted, the factor of safety against liquefaction is first required. 
 
A spreadsheet was developed to carry out the discussed manhole uplift calculations.  
The spreadsheet provides the factor of safety against uplift (as well as liquefaction 
factor of safety for completeness), as well as determining the required manhole mass 
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in order to achieve neutral buoyancy (and hence for heavier masses uplift will not 
occur). 
 
10.3 First-order estimation of uplift displacements 
A limitation of the uplift factor of safety assessment is that it does not provide an 
assessment of the consequent uplift displacements which may occur.  Unfortunately, 
at present, there is not a great body of knowledge on simplified methods by which to 
calculate such displacements.  One such method is that of Sasaki and Tamura (2004), 
which is based on a simple differential equation with empirical parameters calibrated 
from several centrifuge tests.  The method of Sasaki and Tamura is also implemented 
in the aforementioned spreadsheet.  It is noted in particular, that the uplift 
displacements are dependent on the assessed duration of shaking.  Based on 
judgement the duration of shaking should be the 5-95% significant duration parameter, 
which approximately represents the duration of the body wave and significant surface 
wave arrivals.  Calculation of this significant duration as a function of earthquake 
magnitude and source-to-site distance can be calculated using empirical equations 
such as Bommer et al. (2009). 
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11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Seismic Demand 
1) The ground motions produced by the 2010-2011 earthquakes within 
Christchurch and its surroundings were recorded by a dense array of strong 
motion instruments thus providing an excellent record and data for 
characterization of the ground motions and their distribution within the 
affected region. 
2) The ground motions are characterized with high and damaging peak 
amplitudes, with horizontal (geometric mean) peak ground accelerations of 
0.18-0.674 g and horizontal peak ground velocities of 27.6-72.8 cm/s. 
3) When combining the peak amplitude with the number of significant cycles, 
moderate to high cyclic stress ratios (CSR7.5(wt)) were obtained for depths two 
metres below the water table. These stress ratios increase with depth as 
indicated in the footnote of Table 1. 
4) All intensity measures are consistent and indicate that the intensity of the 
ground motion in the CBD and eastern suburbs was on average 1.5 to 2.0 
times that observed in the western suburbs during the 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake. Any comparison of the performance of the water or wastewater 
networks must account for this difference in the seismic demand (different 
inertial and kinematic loads imposed by the earthquake in different parts of the 
city). 
5) The PGA is proxy for the inertial loads imposed on rigid structures above the 
ground, PGV is proxy for the kinematic loads on buried structures due to 
ground movement while the CSR is proxy for the intensity of the motion with 
respect to liquefaction triggering. 
6) The observations and effects of the 2010-2011 earthquakes must be kept in the 
context of these very severe and damaging ground motions produced by these 
events. 
 
 
Soil Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading 
1) Widespread and severe liquefaction occurred in the suburbs of Christchurch 
and its CBD. Such extensiveness and severity of liquefaction in native soils is 
exceptional by international standards. 
2) The repeated and very severe liquefaction particularly along the Avon River 
and in some other localized areas, clearly indicate that such soils have very 
low liquefaction resistance. There are several contributing factors to such low 
resistance: 
i) By composition and their plasticity, (non-plastic sands, silty sands, 
sandy silts, and silt-sand-gravel mixtures) the soils are highly 
susceptible to liquefaction. 
ii) Their in situ state (conditions) including full saturation (high water 
table), medium or loose to very loose density and fluvial deposits 
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fabric (granular structure of river deposits) all point out to a high 
liquefaction potential (or low liquefaction resistance). 
iii) The soils are relatively young and apparently free of any serious 
aging effects, which again suggests a low liquefaction resistance.  
iv) The groundwater regime of Christchurch is exceptional with 
significant groundwater flow through aquifers and many wells and 
natural springs in the area. The artesian pressure and upward water 
flow reduce the effective stress in the subsurface soils and reduce 
(eliminate) the possibility for soils to get stiffer and stronger due to 
aging effects. Liquefaction resistance is known to increase with the 
age of soils due to changes in their micro-structure and cementation 
(aging effect). We speculate that such aging effects on soils could not 
develop in the Christchurch groundwater environment. 
v) Finally, we have to emphasize again that the severity of ground 
shaking together with the aforementioned factors played key role in 
the severity and extensiveness of the induced liquefaction.   
3) Ground surveying measurements at approximately 80 locations along Avon 
River indicate maximum (relative) magnitudes of permanent lateral ground 
displacements due to spreading of liquefied soils on the order of 1.0 – 2.0 m. 
The spreading typically extended inland up to a distance of 100 m to 250 m 
from the waterway. 
4) Different spreading patterns and distribution of lateral displacements with 
distance from the waterway were observed in North Kaiapoi, South Kaiapoi 
and along Avon River in Christchurch. In addition to the more conventional 
‘exponential decay’ distribution where the spreading displacements rapidly 
decrease with the distance from the waterway, a block-mode failure was 
observed in South Kaiapoi with the largest and very damaging ground fissures 
opening at a distance of approximately 125-250 m from the waterway. The 
spreading along the meandering loops of Avon River showed very complex 
pattern and was affected by the interplay of soil conditions, topography, river 
geometry and local depositional environment. 
5) The spreading induced very large and non-uniform ground 
deformation/displacements in the affected zone severely impacting 
infrastructure in the area. Road bridges suffered consistent spreading-induced 
damage and deformation mechanism including rotation of the abutments 
associated with deck pinning and damage at the top of the piles. Slumping of 
the approaches was also typical damage feature at locations of large lateral 
spreads. Loss of grade in gravity pipes, breakage of brittle pipes, failure of 
joints and connections were typical failures in potable water and wastewater 
pipe networks of Christchurch. 
6) When evaluating lateral spreading one should carefully consider ground 
elevation (direction of sloping), river geometry (meandering, loops, cutbanks, 
point bar deposits), presence of weakened zones (old river channels, fills, etc.) 
and geotechnical conditions, then develop lateral spreading zoning and 
probable range of spreading displacements and their distribution, and assess 
the loads and deformation of the pipeline having in mind its particular layout 
relative to the direction of lateral spreading. 
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Performance of the Potable Water System - Watermains 
1) For all pipe materials except PE pipes, there is a clear increase in the affected 
length (percentage of damage) with increasing liquefaction severity. 
2) For steel (S), asbestos cement (AC) and other material pipes, the percentage of 
damaged pipes in areas of severe liquefaction was very high, between 15% 
and 22%. 
3) PVC pipes suffered two to four times less damage than S, AC and other 
material pipes. 
4) There is an indication that PE pipes performed well though the watermains 
sample is too small for any definitive conclusions. For the same reason, the 
“anomalous” result obtained (where the only damaged PE pipe is in ‘no 
liquefaction’ area) should be ignored until data and details of the failure/repair 
of the short pipe segment of PE pipe are available/clarified. 
5) The level of pipe damage in no liquefaction and not inspected areas are similar 
indicating that ground displacements/performance were similar in these areas 
(with general absence of liquefaction manifestation). This fact together with 
the findings that the percentage of damage was linked to and increased with 
liquefaction severity provide an independent verification of the good quality 
and reliability of the generated liquefaction map shown in Figure 6. 
Submains 
6) GI pipes performed poorly with 17% damaged length in areas of low to 
moderate liquefaction and 26% damaged pipes in areas of severe liquefaction. 
7) For PE submain pipes, the percentage of damaged length ranged between 
1.4% (not inspected areas) and 5.2% (areas of severe liquefaction). Again, 
there was a clear increase in damage with liquefaction severity. 
8) PE pipes suffered, on average, five to six times less damage than GI pipes. 
9) For PVC pipes, the percentage of damaged length ranged between 2% and 3% 
(for non-liquefied and severe liquefaction areas respectively). However, the 
PVC pipes sample size was insufficient and hence the PVC submains results 
should be treated with caution. 
10) Comparing the damage of watermains and submains, it appears that for each 
pipe material the damage to the submains was larger than the damage to the 
mains. It is important to understand what features/details contributed to this 
outcome. The total damaged length of submains was smaller however because 
over 80% of the submains were comprised of the well performing PE pipes. 
11) Even though in the simplest form of the analysis the damage is always 
associated with certain pipe material, the nominally defined “failures” include 
(and probably are dominated at least for the PE pipes) by failures of particular 
components (joints, connections, fire hydrant details, crossovers, laterals) 
rather than pipe failures. It is critically important therefore to discriminate 
between different types of failure and carry out a more rigorous second stage 
analysis, which will help us to identify key weaknesses and also “good 
design/construction details/characteristics” of the pre-earthquake potable 
water system. 
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12) Having in mind the severity of ground shaking and failures caused by the 
earthquakes, as well as the reasonably quick restoration of potable water 
services throughout the city, one may argue that, by and large, the potable 
water system performed satisfactorily under the extreme seismic events. 
 
Performance of the Wastewater System 
1) The wastewater system of Christchurch was damaged severely by the series of 
strong earthquakes. This extensive damage is clearly related to a greater 
vulnerability of the wastewater pipe network to liquefaction and lateral 
spreading because of its larger depth of embedment, as compared to the 
potable water system. 
2) Out of total pipe length of 1766 km shown in Figure 22, 542 km or 31% of the 
pipes had limited service and 142 km or 8 % had no service nearly one month 
after the 22 February earthquake. This clearly illustrates the severity of the 
impacts and damage level to the system. 
3) By and large, the performance of the wastewater system was poor and not 
satisfactory (below desirable level/standard) despite the acknowledgement of 
the extreme severity of the earthquakes and liquefaction-induced ground 
failures. 
4) Detailed information on the damage to the wastewater system was still not 
available because of the extensive damage and very difficult accessibility due 
to the large embedment depth. The following damage inspections and data 
collection efforts on the wastewater system are noted: 
- CCTV inspections have been completed for parts of the damaged 
network after the Darfield earthquake. 
- CCTV inspections have been also conducted for parts of the network 
after the 22 February earthquake.  
- Information on manholes including their movement relative to the 
adjacent road surface has been also compiled. 
It is critically important to systematically collect, interpret and analyse these 
data in order to find out what worked well and what didn’t work in the 
existing wastewater system, and to identify key modes of failure/damage. In 
addition to the abovementioned data/information, the project team 
recommended and initiated: 
- Detailed case studies in selected areas in order to collect data and 
information on the performance of the network targeting specific 
sections/details of the system. 
- Development of systematic field inspection procedures/form for 
documenting relevant damage data during repairs over the period of 
reinstatement of the system. 
5) Further studies and analyses of the wastewater network are required and 
strongly recommended (at all three levels of analyses and both in its simplified 
form and also by discriminating different failure types and damage 
contributions. While desk-top studies/analyses should accompany such efforts, 
they cannot provide on their own good quality information that will feed 
recovery decisions, more robust design solutions or better long-term resilience 
of the system. 
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CCC Issues and Considerations 
1) The 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes affected the pipe networks in 
various ways and impacted their ability to provide adequate service to large 
areas of Christchurch. This was demonstrated in the following ways, amongst 
others: 
- Gravity reticulation experienced reduced capacities.   
- Potable water networks and pressure sewers experienced leakage and loss of 
pressure. 
- Wastewater reticulation had increased flows.  
- Pump stations were incapacitated. 
- All networks experienced damage leading to blockage or leakage at the 
interface with structures. 
A significant effect on the gravity pipe network has been the movement of pipe 
sections relative to each other, the surrounding ground and/or structures. This 
movement is evidenced by changes in grade, varying grades along a pipe length, 
or joint dislocation either within the pipe length, or at connections to structures. 
Effects included: 
- The loss of grade, which has reduced capacity particularly in gravity lines. 
- Inconsistencies in the invert level, which has encouraged deposition and 
reduced capacity. 
- Partial or complete blockage of main lines or laterals. 
- Joint damage or movement, allowing silt and groundwater infiltration or 
discharge of wastewater to groundwater. 
- Depressions in carriageways caused by infiltration of subgrade materials 
into the gravity system (or removal of liquefied subsoils through 
groundwater flow towards the surface). 
Pressure networks have also experienced  
- Leakage and loss of pressure due to pipe and joint damage. 
- Blockage and damage to pumps and treatment facilities from ground 
movement including settlement, uplift and lateral displacements; and from 
mobilised silt in the wastewater stream. 
Some portions of Christchurch’s gravity reticulation network are installed at 
depths exceeding 2.5m. Damage to these lines has meant that there have been: 
- Large numbers of repairs at depth. 
- Delays when repairing, and high reinstatement costs, due to the required 
dewatering and trench support. 
2) In order to inform and improve the design and construction of replacement 
infrastructure and to ensure future assets perform to acceptable levels of 
service, current Christchurch City Council material, design and construction 
specifications were reviewed. The standard CCC details were reviewed with 
respect to concept, geofabric selection and grading of the backfill and 
foundation material. Matters considered included a review of current best 
practice, an examination of alternative design and construction options, and 
possible opportunities to utilise these to increase the resilience of the built 
infrastructure. Overseas experience was also canvassed and the proposals from 
such experiences were examined in light of Christchurch conditions for their 
applicability. A set of construction alternatives were also considered/ 
developed including: 
 
 70
- Pipe haunching or surround and backfill details 
- PE pipe construction 
- Manhole construction 
- Pipe material selection 
- Joint details 
- Sewer depths and grades 
- Performance-based design concepts and objectives 
 
Liquefaction Resistance Map 
1) Liquefaction Resistance Index (LRI) map of Christchurch was developed 
providing liquefaction zoning for the purpose of design/reinstatement/recovery 
of the potable water and wastewater systems. 
2) The map is based solely on observations from the 2010-2011 earthquakes and 
uses actual acceleration records to quantify the seismic demand (severity of 
ground shaking) and observed liquefaction manifestation (liquefaction maps) 
to quantify the severity of land damage. 
3) The LRI map (Figure 28) shows the LRI at water table depth. The intent of the 
map is to show the liquefaction resistance in relative terms (between different 
areas of Christchurch), though absolute resistance could be also easily inferred. 
4) Four zones are defined and quantified in the map: Zone 1 to Zone 4. They 
indicate relative liquefaction resistance, where the lower bound value of 0.065 
of Zone 1 provides the reference resistance; for example, Zone 3 has a 
liquefaction resistance three times that of Zone 1. 
5) Zone 0 (red area) identifies areas with resistance equal to or lower than the 
reference resistance. 
6) There was no sufficient evidence for zoning of the grey areas. It us 
recommended to use the performance of the water and wastewater networks in 
these areas as gauge of the ground performance (liquefaction resistance), for 
provisional classification, since clear link between the performance of the 
potable water and severity of liquefaction has been established. One should be 
rigorous when comparing different parts of the network (and apply this to 
network segments with similar design/material characteristics) and also 
reasonably conservative when adopting this approach of provisional zoning of 
the uninspected grey areas. 
7) Table 5 provides estimates of ground deformation (settlement, lateral 
displacement, strains) for each of the zones. These estimates are based on 
expert judgement and should be applied within the restrictions stated in the 
footnote.  
8) The map should be considered as a provisional tool until more robust and 
better zoning map/information is made available. It does have however an 
inherent quality in that it provides actual evidence of ground performance 
during these earthquakes, while accounting for the different levels of ground 
shaking severity across Christchurch.  
9) The map is based on general liquefaction map and does include significant 
variation even within a single zone; we assume that most of the estimates are 
on the conservative side, but this is not necessarily always the case.  
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